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Although a long-standing history of scholarship has sought to understand the potential for 
disparities in criminal punishment based on ascribed status characteristics, contemporary 
research has largely ignored the ways in which punishment outcomes vary across offenders 
convicted of offenses traditionally viewed as either white-collar or street crimes. Using 
data from United States federal district courts from fiscal years 2008-2010, this research 
expands current knowledge by comparing embezzlement and larceny offenders in federal 
criminal courts across a variety of punishment processes and outcomes. The findings 
suggest a substantial degree of variation in punishment severity between embezzlement 
and larceny offenders across modes of punishment. Generally, the question of whether 
white-collar offenders are treated severely, leniently, or about the same as non-violent 
property offenders is largely dependent upon the outcome of interest and the specific types 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
In wake of a series of high profile incidents of white-collar crime, corporate 
malfeasance, and the recent defaults and foreclosures following the subprime mortgage 
crisis, there has been considerable focus in the media and the general public on the issue 
of white-collar crime. Along with the rise in attention given to white-collar criminality, 
there appears to be a growing faction of public support for more severe punishment for 
white-collar offenders and a general sense of outrage among many at the perceived 
leniency given to white-collar offenders, who are thought to receive little punishment for 
behavior that causes immense social harm (Schoepfer et al., 2007; Piquero et al., 2008; 
Unnever et al., 2008; Cullen et al., 2009). Although fairness of punishment remains a core 
principle of the American criminal justice system that seeks to uphold the adage of Justice 
Potter Stewart that “fairness is what justice really is,” there are concerns that the criminal 
justice system promotes inequality in punishment based on one’s perceived status and 
power.  
Contributing to the ongoing deliberations regarding fairness in the criminal justice 
system is a vast amount of criminological research on the types of characteristics that 
influence punishment outcomes for offenders and how public policy can be used to create 
a more balanced system of justice across all segments of society (Frankel, 1973; Tonry, 
1996; Steffensmeier, et al., 1998; Spohn, 2000). While these sociological assessments of 
punishment have generated a plethora of discussion and policy changes, with the goal of 
ensuring punishment be both appropriate and equitable, the focus of sentencing research 
and theoretical developments explaining punishment outcomes largely focuses on 





these recent developments have left the question of white-collar sentences unexplored. 
Consequently, modern sentencing research is limited as it lacks a clear understanding of 
whether those convicted of white-collar crimes are treated more leniently in comparison to 
those convicted of offenses traditionally viewed as street crimes.  
With a lack of empirical research to answer questions about the treatment of white-
collar offenders, many are left to speculate and rely either on anecdotal cases of white-
collar crime prosecution or the commonly held assumption that the criminal justice system 
treats white-collar offenders more leniently than street offenders (Taibbi, 2013; Dervan, 
2014; Buell, 2014). Such an assumption is likely related to several factors. First, there is 
evidence lenient treatment has been given to white-collar offenders in the past, and such 
incidents of leniency may lead to questions of accountability and whether there is general 
lack of willingness among authorities to bring criminal charges against those who engage 
in white-collar crime (Sutherland, 1983; Breyer, 1988; Cullen et al., 2009). Second, many 
types of white-collar offenses have traditionally been viewed as less serious than street 
offenses such as property, drug, or violent crimes. This is especially true as both resources 
and attention among criminal justice decision-makers, as well as the general public remains 
heavily focused on violent and drug crimes; consequently white-collar crimes receive far 
less attention (Ross, 1907; Sutherland, 1983; Benson & Cullen, 1998; Rosenmerkel, 2001; 
Cullen et al., 2009; Hagan, 2012). Highlighting this issue, a financial fraud investigator in 
an interview with a local news outlet recently stated, “they [white-collar criminals] are not 
taken as seriously as other crimes because they're not violent, and most offenders are 





Yet, this general perception of leniency clashes with two major shifts indicating a 
movement toward increasingly severe punishment for white-collar offenders. Whereas, in 
the past the general public has been reluctant to view white-collar offenders as being 
serious in comparison to offenders who commit crimes physically against persons or 
property, there is evidence this trend is changing. Recent public opinion appears to be 
moving in a direction that views white-collar crime as a serious problem, supporting a 
greater devotion of resources to enforcement and more stringent punishment for white-
collar offenders (Piquero et al., 2008; Unnever et al., 2008; Cullen et al., 2009; Huff et al., 
2010).1 For example, the 2010 National Public Survey on White Collar Crime found a 
majority of respondents’ viewed white-collar crimes as more serious than traditional 
crimes, and that the government is not allocating enough resources to combat white-collar 
crime (Huff et al., 2010).2 This is an important change as public perceptions of crime 
seriousness may serve to inform criminal justice decision-makers which behaviors are 
viewed more or less seriously, as well serve as a signal of the appropriateness of current 
practices and resource allocation (Wolfgang et al., 1985; Hoffman & Hardyman, 1986). 
Second, in recent years, there have been a series of policy changes implemented in response 
                                                            
1 The term “white-collar crime” is a broad category encompassing numerous behaviors that vary based on 
the definitional approach used. Most public opinion surveys aim to identify the levels of public punitiveness 
toward a single type of “white-collar” offense, (often in comparison to some non-white-collar offense). For 
instance, the seriousness of knowingly shipping diseased meat compared to robbery at gunpoint that caused 
serious injury (Piquero et al., 2008); fraud compared to robbery (Holtfreter, 2008). Further, opinions of public 
punitiveness are found to vary based on demographic factors, such as class and race (Unnever et al., 2008), 
gender (Cullen et al., 1985; Cohn et al., 1991); or the type of crime (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980).  
2 To determine the seriousness of white-collar crime in comparison with other forms of crime “respondents 
were presented with 12 scenarios that included various white collar crimes as well as traditional offenses. 
The scenarios were grouped into eight categories. These categories were, in turn, ordered into four 
dichotomies: (1) white collar/traditional crime, (2) crimes involving physical harm/money, (3) crimes 
involving organizational/individual offenders, and (4) crimes involving high-status/low-status offenders” 
(Huff et al., 2010: p. 9). Regarding the allocation of resources respondents were asked: Please tell me if you 
agree, disagree, or neither agree nor disagree with the following statement: The government is devoting 





to both perceptions and some empirical findings showing the presence of lenient 
punishment toward white-collar offenders (Breyer, 1988; Bibas, 2005). These policy 
changes have sought to increase the severity of punishments for white-collar offenses in 
order to bring these crimes in line with punishment levels for non-violent property crimes. 
For instance, since the implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a series of 
legislative decisions have increased the levels of punishment at the federal level for white-
collar offenses, such as fraud and embezzlement to be closely in accordance with offenses 
for non-violent property crimes, such as larceny and theft (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
1987; Bibas, 2005; U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2011; see also U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1).3  Placing attention on shifts in public policy is an important 
focus as changes to federal sentencing guidelines may have altered the balance from lenient 
treatment of white-collar crimes in the past to increasingly harsh punishments for this group 
in the present day. Changes to the sentencing guidelines may in fact be so great that one 
federal judge recently referred to the federal sentencing guidelines for white-collar offenses 
as “too goddamn severe” (Goodman, 2014).  
Although evidence suggests the previous wave of lenient treatment of white-collar 
offenders may be fading, a paradox remains between perceptions of how white-collar 
offenders are handled by the criminal justice system and what actually occurs at time of 
sentencing. While the media, judges, the general public, and academics alike continue to 
bemoan the disparities in punishment between perpetrators of white-collar and street 
crimes, there remains little empirical analysis assessing the veracity of the claim that white-
                                                            
3 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1. 1 classifies both white-collar and non-violent property crimes 
together including:  Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; 
Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit 





collar offenders “get off easy” (Cullen et al., 2009; Hagan, 2012; Taibbi, 2013; Buell, 
2014). This investigation explores this unresolved problem seeking to answer three 
questions.  
(1) Are white-collar offenders treated more leniently than non-violent property 
offenders? Specifically, exploiting a growing sentiment around increased severity in 
punishment for white-collar offenders and changes in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, I test for differences in punishment across a variety of sentencing processes and 
outcomes for the white-collar crime of embezzlement and the comparable street offense of 
larceny. I specifically choose to compare embezzlement with larceny for following reasons. 
First, the two classes of crimes share similarities. Both are economic crimes that result in 
financial loses to a victim without the use or threat of force. Additionally, perpetrators of 
both types of crimes typically seek to avoid contact with the victim and use deception in 
carrying out the offense. Second, several policy changes implemented by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission have sought to change the punishment levels for a number of 
common white-collar crimes, including embezzlement to be statutorily equivalent to 
larceny. Third, the data from the United States Sentencing Commission support the notion 
of comparability as an evaluation of the distributions of the presumptive sentence 
recommendation for embezzlement and larceny offenders show a substantial degree of 
overlap (see Figure 1 below). Finally, prior research comparing punishment of white-collar 
offenders and street property offenders has used the crime of theft as a comparison group 
(see Johnson, 1986; Tillman & Pontell, 1992; Van Slyke & Bales, 2012). Therefore, results 





(2) To what extent does the mode of punishment condition the effect of white-collar 
status on final sentencing outcomes. While previous scholarship on sentencing and white-
collar crime prior to the implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines focused only 
on the decision to incarcerate and sentence length as measures of punishment severity, 
(Wheeler et al., 1982; 1988), I expand this analysis by assessing a variety of processing 
and punishment outcomes including departures from sentencing guidelines, pretrial 
detainment, and financial penalties, as well as decisions to incarcerate and multiple 
measures of sentence length. Looking at multiple outcomes is important as it is possible 
that in light of increasingly severe changes to the sentencing guidelines for white-collar 
offenses, judges may now be increasingly likely to depart downward from the guideline 
recommendation for a variety of white-collar offenses.  
(3) Finally, I look across specific types of embezzlement and larceny offenses to 
test the extent to which the specific type of offense conditions the effect of white-collar 
status on final sentencing outcomes. By using a more comprehensive dataset than prior 
research in this area, I am able to examine variation across specific types of offenses.   
To explore these questions, this study uses data from the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) on criminal proceedings in federal district courts from 2008-2010. 
This data source allows for a more robust analysis than prior research by accounting for a 
series of relevant factors of judicial decision-making previously neglected by white-collar 
crime research.  The remainder of this study will proceed as follows. First, I discuss prior 
research on punishment of white-collar offenders, the definition of white-collar crime, and 
the differences in white-collar and traditional street offenders. In doing so I focus on the 





Next, I apply theories of punishment to explain criminal sentencing of white-collar 
offenders. Finally, I introduce a series of hypotheses and empirically test these questions 
using sentencing data from federal district courts. I conclude by offering interpretation of 
my findings and discuss areas for future research.  
 













Chapter 2: Literature Review & Theory 
 
Punishment and the White-Collar Criminal  
 
In his pioneering work on white-collar crime, Edwin Sutherland contended that 
several factors contribute to white-collar offenders’ receiving preferential treatment by the 
criminal justice system. First, he posited the white-collar offender would be capable of 
using their social status and connections in society to avoid formal criminal punishment. 
Second, the cultural homogeneity between white-collar offenders and enforcement 
authorities creates sympathy, understanding, and a reluctance to pursue the harshest 
channels of punishment. Third, he argued that public support against white-collar offenders 
is less organized, thus making it more difficult to pursue criminal charges against this group 
of offenders. Although Sutherland’s analysis was limited to the context of the early 20th 
century and a number of societal changes have occurred since then, over seven decades 
later many of Sutherland’s arguments may still apply and echo similar accounts explaining 
why white-collar offenders get off easier (Sutherland, 1940, 1983).  
In the years after Sutherland’s call for attention to the behavior of the white-collar 
criminal, punishments for white-collar crimes have traditionally remained less severe as 
compared to traditional street crimes such as violent, drug, and non-violent property 
offenses. For instance, Bibas (2005) notes that prior to the Sentencing Guidelines there was 
a perception that white-collar offenders had a low-risk of recidivism and posed little danger 
to the community and therefore typically received “soft punishments” such as probation, 
community service or restitution (see also Mann et al., 1979; Mann, 1985). This notion is 
further supported by evidence showing white-collar offenders as having been more likely 





equivalent amounts of money and white-collar offenders who are sentenced to prison 
received shorter sentences than comparable property offenders (Breyer, 1988). For 
example, research by the U.S. Sentencing Commission conducted by then-judge Stephen 
Breyer found, “courts granted probation to [white-collar] offenders more frequently than 
in situations involving analogous common law crimes; furthermore, prison terms were less 
severe for white collar criminals who did not receive probation…” (Breyer, 1988: cited 
from Richman, 2013: p. 55). 
 However, shifts in public perceptions and policies regulating judicial discretion 
and corporate behavior may contribute to a changing dynamic in the way which white-
collar offenders are treated by the criminal justice system. Recent evidence suggests the 
long-standing pattern of leniency toward white-collar offenders may be changing (Cullen 
et al., 2009) and punishment for this group is becoming increasingly severe (Weissman & 
Block, 2007; Tucker, 2014). The potential for more severe punishment toward white-collar 
offenders is driven by a series of factors. First, a number of legislative changes have sought 
to increase punishment severity in order to bring white-collar offenses in line with those of 
non-violent property offenses. Specifically, since the enactment of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, a series of policy implementations at the federal level have been intended to 
enhance sentencing severity of white-collar crimes, such as fraud and embezzlement to 
match their street property crime equivalent of larceny and theft (Bibas, 2005; see 
Richman, 2013: p. 55).4  In the early 1980s, Congress expressed interest in raising white-
                                                            
4 Richman, (2013: p. 55) notes judicial tendencies of leniency toward white-collar offenders were a concern 
of Congress when drafting the Sentencing Reform Act in 1984. The cited Senate report states: “[It is our] 
view that in the past there have been many cases, particularly in instances of major white collar crime, in 
which probation has been granted because the offender required little or nothing in the way of 
institutionalized rehabilitative measures . . . and because society required no insulation from the offender, 





collar sentences and the Sentencing Commission raised the sentencing ranges of white-
collar crimes to be equivalent with larceny sentences. On this issue, one report from the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission states: “the sentences for ‘white-collar’ crimes, such as 
embezzlement, fraud and tax evasion, were considerably lower than those for the 
substantively equivalent crime of larceny. In light of the legislative history supporting 
higher sentences for white-collar crime, the Commission made a policy decision to adopt 
a guideline structure under which all of these crimes are treated essentially identically 
[emphasis added]. Average sentences for larceny were lowered slightly, while those for 
white-collar crimes were raised to the same level” (see U.S. Sentencing Commission, 1987: 
18).  
Following these changes, an increasing number of white-collar defendants faced 
imprisonment and lengthier sentences than in the past (Bibas, 2005). However, changes to 
the Sentencing Guidelines did not eliminate perceptions of leniency toward white-collar 
offenders. Despite the fact that Sentencing Guideline penalties for moderate to serious 
white-collar offenses had become large enough to be similar or even greater than sentences 
for some drug and violent offenses at the federal level, the Department of Justice and others 
still continued to insist that the penalties of white-collar offenses were not high enough 
(Bowman, 2003). The Sentencing Commission again raised sentences for both larceny and 
fraud in 1998 and again in 2001 through the passage of the Economic Crime Package. 
Following the collapse of Enron in late 2001, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
                                                            
readily perceivable receipt of just punishment accorded by incarceration were of critical importance. The 
placing on probation of [a white collar criminal] may be perfectly appropriate in cases in which, under all the 
circumstances, only the rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a sentence may be grossly 
inappropriate, however, in cases in which the circumstances mandate the sentence’s carrying substantial 





2002, which led the Sentencing Commission to further enhance penalties for fraud and add 
additional enhancements such as requirements to imprison defendants for moderate to large 
size frauds (Bowman, 2003; Bibas, 2005). These additional enhancements substantially 
effected punishments for white-collar crimes. For instance, among the most common 
federal white-collar crimes of wire and mail fraud, the maximum sentence length was 
increased from 5 years to 20 years (U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2003).  
In addition, punishment of white-collar offenders may be connected to public 
resentment toward this group. In explaining the reasons for leniency and differential 
application of the law in the area of white-collar crime, Sutherland noted a key factor was 
the “relatively unorganized resentment of the public toward white collar crimes” 
(Sutherland, 1983: 59).5 While this unorganized resentment may partially explain the 
scarcity of criminal charges for white-collar offenders in the past, recent evidence points 
to a shift in public opinion. Unnever, et al., (2008) suggest that attitudes toward white-
collar and corporate offenders imply a growing consensus around the desire for more 
severe sanctions (see also Piquero et al., 2008). Further, Cullen et al., (2009) contends that 
public opinion toward white-collar crime in the United States has transitioned through 
waves of attentiveness about the problem of white-collar crime. Today public opinion has 
transformed to the extent that high profile white-collar offenders are no longer viewed as 
respected members of the community but are rather seen as “bad guys” marked by 
excessive greed and a lack of remorse for their harm on society. Such a shift in public 
opinion may translate to a retributive philosophy of punishment that seeks sentencing 
                                                            
5 Also see E. A. Ross’ claim about the lack of public resentment toward high status offenders: “there has not 
yet been enough time to store up strong emotions about them; and so the sight of them does not let loose the 





policies that reflect a revenge-based mentality and create more severe punishment 
outcomes for white-collar offenders (see also Katz, 1980).6 In light of a series of high 
profile white-collar crimes and perceptions of a growing threat of victimization from 
behaviors such as fraud, the organized public sentiment appears to be turning in support of 
more punitive treatment of the white-collar criminal (Cullen et al., 2009; Levi, 2009; Deevy 
& Beals, 2013).7 
Defining White-Collar Crime  
 
 There remains a long standing debate on whether the definition of white-collar 
crime should be focused around an offense or offender characteristics and whether such a 
definition should incorporate only those adjudicated as criminal or any behavior eligible of 
receiving a criminal disposition (Sutherland, 1945; Tappan, 1947; Edelhertz, 1970; Clinard 
& Yeager, 1980 Benson & Simpson, 2009). This study remains in line with prior research 
on sentencing and white-collar crime, and employs the offense-based approach used by the 
Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime, defining white-collar crimes as “economic crimes 
committed through the use of some combination of fraud, deception or collusion” (Wheeler 
et al., 1988).8 Thus, white-collar crimes are acts committed through mechanisms of 
                                                            
6 Cullen et al., (2009: 42) cautions against the retributive mindset in punishment of white-collar offenders for 
two reasons. First, “it encourages a blood lust among the public that leads them to embrace inordinately 
lengthy prison sentences.” Secondly, “the focus on individual ‘bad guys’ and their punishment potentially 
deflects attention away from the structural and political conditions that made many of the most egregious 
scandals possible.” 
7 I only contend that there are perceptions of a greater threat of victimization of such behaviors detailed 
above. Such perceptions may stem from an actual increase in fraudulent behavior, an increase in victim 
awareness, or changes in criminal justice response. Regardless of the source, an increase in the perceptions 
of the threat of victimization should influence public sentiment toward white-collar crimes.  
8 The Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime was a series of projects led by Stanton Wheeler and supported by 
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The project was tasked to collect empirical data on a variety 
topics focused around the issue of white-collar crime, including analyses of white-collar offenders 
themselves, judges in sentencing of white-collar offenders, interviews with white-collar defense attorneys, 
issues related to white-collar offenses and agencies assigned to regulate these offenses. For more information 





concealment and deception rather than interpersonal exchanges of physical force or 
intimidation.9  
It may be argued that this version of white-collar crime does not collate with the 
image of a person of respectability and high social status, who violates the law in the course 
of his or her occupation, as proposed by Sutherland (Sutherland, 1983: 7). Instead, past 
sentencing research, using an offense-based definition typically yields a sample of 
offenders who appear more middle-class than high status (Weisburd et al., 1991). Thus, a 
criticism of using an offense-based definitional approach of white-collar crime is that it 
misses the inclusion of “powerful individuals and corporate actors who are able to avoid 
official labeling in the first place and never appear in the resulting samples” (Benson & 
Simpson, 2009; see also Sutherland, 1983). This is a limitation that may affect the sample 
of white-collar offenders in this study, as offenders with more resources may have a greater 
likelihood of avoiding detection for their offenses or having their case brought forth in civil 
or regulatory proceedings, rather than processing in the criminal justice system. For 
instance, in a recent white-collar criminal proceeding against a major financial institution 
involving a monetary settlement used to avoid criminal charges, prompted a federal judge 
to comment, “the public has very little confidence in white collar crime proceedings. The 
perception is that no one is treating white collar crime seriously… bank executives come 
into court, plead guilty, go back on the subway, go home and watch soap operas and life 
goes on” (Clark, 2010). Consequently, this study is limited, as it does not capture all 
possible offenses or offenders that may constitute the population of white-collar criminals 
                                                            
9 The definition used by the Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime resulted in eight offenses being defined as 
white-collar crime: securities violations, antitrust violations, bribery, bank embezzlement, mail and wire 
fraud, tax fraud, false claims and statements, credit and lending institution fraud (see Wheeler et al., 1982; 





and specifically is most likely to omit those offenders of higher social status. Moreover, 
among high status individuals involved in white-collar crime and corporate malfeasance, 
charges are often brought against company solely, with individuals in the organization 
spared of any formal criminal charges (Schmidt & Wayatt, 2012). Thus, the offenders in 
the current sample are likely to represent “run of the mill lower white-collar cases” 
(Wheeler et al., 1982: 657).   
 Yet, available evidence using an offense-based definition of white-collar crime 
suggests white-collar offenders adjudicated in criminal courts are generally different from 
ordinary street offenders. This line of research largely concludes that compared to the 
common street criminal, white-collar offenders are older, more likely to be male, more 
likely to be white, have less job instability, are more financially secure, and are better 
educated (Daly, 1989; Weisburd et al., 1990a, 2001; Benson & Moore, 1992; Benson & 
Kerley, 2000). Additional research finds that white-collar offenders’ criminal careers 
“begin later and evidence a lower frequency of offending” when compared to traditional 
offenders (Weisburd et al., 1990a: 352). Evidence also suggests that white-collar offenders 
may take a different path all together into crime. For instance, Benson & Moore (1992), 
speculate that white-collar offenders follow a different route into illegality than street 
offenders, with a motivation that derives from a desire to avoid failure and protect one’s 
status and relative social position (see also Cressey, 1953; Zietz, 1981).10 Individual white-
collar offenders also tend to view themselves as conventional law abiding citizens rather 
wrongdoers (Benson, 1985).  
                                                            
10 Some theorist purport there is no difference in the underlying causes between white-collar offenders and 






While these studies are limited in many regards, past research portrays an image of 
what the average white-collar offender may look like. Ultimately, the image arising from 
this picture depicts the white-collar offenders’ status as closer to middle-class, rather than 
high social status (Weisburd et al., 1991). I argue these differences strengthen the purpose 
of this study in two ways. First, this evidence highlights that there is comparability between 
these two groups as white-collar defendants are not so socially distant as to make any 
comparisons of sentencing outcomes between the two groups implausible. Further, judges 
may be influenced by these differences in defendant characteristics, ultimately leading to 
more lenient punishment for white-collar offenders, as the characteristics of white-collar 
offenders make this group of criminals appear less risky or are perceived to be less of a 
safety concern, as well as are more culturally similar to the judges themselves.  
Prior Work Assessing White-Collar Crime & Sentencing 
 
To date there is a long line of research detailing disparities in criminal punishment 
(Hagan et al., 1973; Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Mustard, 2001; Johnson, 2003). However, 
research on criminal sentencing for white-collar offenders is far less extensive than 
scholarship on sentencing for traditional offenders. Moreover, very few studies directly 
compare the outcomes of white-collar offenders to comparable street offenders, such as 
those accused of non-violent property crimes. Among the research focusing on sentencing 
outcomes of white-collar offenders most use pre-sentencing guidelines data and have 
addressed the topic with data from only a few sources (Maddan et al., 2012; Simpson, 
2013).  
Currently, the most recent comparison between white-collar and street offenders at 





embezzlement and auto theft in the early-1990s (Maddan et al., 2012). The authors 
concluded that white-collar offenders and street offenders receive differential treatment, 
with auto theft offenders in the sample nearly four times more likely to receive a prison 
sentence compared to embezzlers, as well as auto theft offenders receiving sentences on 
average five months longer than embezzlers.  As further evidence for differential treatment 
between white-collar offenders and street offenders, the authors found “auto thieves were 
sentenced more closely with the spirit of the sentencing guidelines (offense seriousness 
and criminal history), while the sentencing of white-collar offenders was more likely to be 
influenced by extralegal variables (sex, education, and acceptance of responsibility)” 
(Maddan et al., 2012: 16).11  
Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines a series of research by John Hagan and 
colleagues compared sentencing outcomes of white-collar and street offenders in a sample 
of ten federal district courts. Hagan et al., (1980) found that there was no significant 
difference in punishment outcomes across white-collar offenders and common offenders.12 
Using the same data, Hagan et al., (1982) focused on income as a measure of social status 
and found that white-collar offenders of higher income levels received more lenient 
sentences in the federal courts examined. Moreover, Nagel and Hagan (1982) explored the 
issue of leniency of white-collar offenders compared to street offenders across federal 
                                                            
11 Maddan et al., (2012: 9) argue auto thieves are a good comparison group for several reasons. First, 
embezzlement and auto theft are similar, as the offender does not physically confront a victim. Second, both 
of these offenses have the potential for similar financial losses to the victim; typically into the thousands of 
dollars. Finally, neither of these offenses receives extensive coverage in the media. Auto theft is rarely 
reported in the media, while white-collar crime typically has long periods of dormancy in the media until a 
major incident pushes it to the fore.  
12 The authors chose to measure status with education. Offenders were placed in one of four possible 
categories: (1) less educated common offenders, (2) college educated common offenders, (3) less educated 
white-collar offenders, (4) college educated white-collar offenders. Results found no significant evidence 





courts and found white-collar offenders did receive preferential treatment in one of the ten 
federal courts, which was characterized by its high volume of white-collar prosecutions. 
The findings lead the authors to conclude that there is a complex pattern of prosecution and 
sentencing of white-collar offenders, which may in part be influenced by different attitudes 
and policies toward the prosecution and treatment of white-collar offenders across 
jurisdictions.  
 Johnson (1986) used aggregate sentencing data from corporate, white-collar, and 
common crime from U.S. district courts, from fiscal years 1964, 1974, and 1984 to examine 
whether shifts in criminal justice policy influenced punishment outcomes among white-
collar and street property offenders over a three-decade period. The study found that over 
time white-collar criminals are more being brought to court more frequently and are 
receiving more severe sanctions. However, at the conclusion of the study, white-collar 
offenders were still found to receive more lenient penalties than the comparison group of 
property offenders.  
Other studies have sought to address the comparison of punishment outcomes 
among white-collar and street offenders at the state-level. Tillman & Pontell (1992), 
addressed the question of punishment of white-collar criminals by comparing sanctions 
imposed on health care providers convicted of defrauding California’s Medicaid system to 
those convicted of grand theft in California. The authors found white-collar offenders were 
less likely to be incarcerated compared to those convicted of grand theft, even though the 
financial damages caused by the white-collar offenders were found to be significantly 
greater. However, the disparities were reduced when the model accounted for regulatory 





government, disciplinary actions by professional boards, and temporary or permanent 
suspensions from the California Medicaid program. Thus, the results suggest that 
alternative sanctions, may serve as factors that mediate criminal punishment for white-
collar offenders.  
A more recent study using state-level sentencing data compared sentencing 
outcomes of probability of incarceration and sentence length among white-collar and street 
property offenders in under the sentencing guidelines in Florida from 1994 to 2004. In the 
study, Van Slyke & Bales (2012) compared those charged with fraud, bribery, and 
embezzlement to burglars and thieves and found that despite the sentencing guidelines 
attempt to reduce disparities between these groups, white-collar offenders were treated 
more leniently than the street property offenders at both sentencing stages. However, the 
authors note that there was considerable variation in sentencing outcomes based on the type 
of white-collar crime, the offender’s social status, and whether the offense occurred before 
or after the Enron scandal.  
Another line of white-collar research has not focused on a direct comparison 
between white-collar and street offenders; instead has primarily concentrated around two 
research questions: (1) whether the social status of white-collar offenders impacts 
sentencing disparities; (2) the ways in which the political climate influences sentencing 
outcomes (Simpson, 2013). Taken as a whole, the literature does not provide any clear 
findings on how white-collar offender’s status influences their punishment outcomes. 
Some results indicate that white-collar offenders were more likely to be treated leniently 
by judges at time of sentencing. For instance, in a comprehensive qualitative study on 





(1979) conducted interviews with fifty-one federal district judges with the goal of learning 
about how judges reached decisions in cases involving white-collar offenders and non-
white-collar cases.13  Although using a limited sample of federal district courts, the research 
provided evidence that that judges view white-collar offenders differently than street 
offenders at sentencing, often expressing greater empathy to the circumstances of the 
white-collar offender (see also Wheeler et al., 1988). Akin to Sutherland’s cultural 
homogeneity hypothesis for leniency in punishment for white-collar offenders, it appears 
judges may incorporate their similar social status and background as a rationalization to 
avoid imprisonment for white-collar defendants. As put by one judge: “… the white-collar 
criminal has more to lose by going to jail, reputation in the community, business as well as 
social community, decent living conditions, just the whole business of being put in a prison 
with a number on his back demeans this tremendous ego that is always involved in people 
who are high achievers” (Mann et al., 1979: 487).  
In contrast, Wheeler et al., (1982) found a significant positive relationship between 
one’s socioeconomic status and both the probability of incarceration and sentence length. 
In exploring this relationship the authors offer three possible explanations. First, is the 
possibility of a selection effect in which at early stages of processing “big fish are siphoned 
off, and only the losers those without smarts or at least without smart attorneys – got to 
jail.” Second, the results may be impacted by the Watergate scandal occurring at nearly the 
same period as data collection for the study. This may suggest a heightened awareness and 
hostile sentiment toward high status offender generated an atmosphere of harsher treatment 
                                                            
13 Judges were neither provided a definition of “white-collar crime” or a definition of “comparable non-
white-collar crimes.” Instead judges were presented with the terms and then asked to formulate their own 





for white-collar offenders (see also Hagan & Parker, 1985; Hagan & Palloni, 1986; Benson 
& Walker, 1988). The third explanation contends both judges and the general public 
reflected a strong sentiment against “crimes of greed rather than crimes of need,” 
suggesting the harshest sentences may have been reserved for high status offender who 
acted purely out of self-interested motivations (Wheeler et al., 1982: 657).  
 However, using a modified version of Yale Studies data used by Wheeler et al., 
(1982), Benson & Walker (1988) find conflicting results with both socio-economic status 
and defendant’s impeccability being unrelated to the likelihood of being incarcerated. 
These findings imply sentencing outcomes for white-collar offenders may be impacted by 
the jurisdiction in which they live and their exposure to white-collar cases, with harsher 
sanctions coming in urban districts that experience higher caseloads of white-collar 
offenses. Therefore, contextual features of the court may account for variation in 
sentencing white-collar offenders (see also Nagel & Hagan, 1982).  
Taking a Marxist theory approach to the question of status and sentencing 
disparities, Hagan & Parker (1985) introduced the structural theory of white-collar crime 
and punishment, which postulates that “class position influences involvement in white-
collar criminal behavior as well as the punishment of this behavior” (p. 304). The findings 
indicate those of higher class positions have greater access and opportunities to benefit 
from their crimes but were also more successful in avoiding formal prosecution for their 
behavior. In a similar approach with organizational position as a measure of status, Benson 
(1989) explores both formal and informal sanctions taken against white-collar offender and 
concludes that job status does not affect the likelihood of incarceration and may have a 





the loss of a job were strongly influenced by one’s position of status. Thus, those of higher 
status are more likely to lose their jobs following a conviction for a white-collar offense 
but they also remain less likely to face severe formal sanctions through the criminal justice 
system. Still, other analysis of the relationship between socioeconomic status, class 
position, and sentencing concludes class position and occupational status to be 
complementary rather than competing indicators. Thus, after controlling for the role of 
social class the effect of status on sentencing largely remains positive with those of higher 
status still more likely to receive prison sentences and receive longer sentences as 
compared to those of lower class (Weisburd et al., 1990b). 
While prior research fails to identify a clear answer of whether social status 
corresponds to harsher treatment of white-collar offenders it is clear that the results are 
particularly sensitive to the definition, offense types, model specification, and a variety of 
contextual factors (Simpson, 2013). For instance, there may be a strong time period effect 
with those studies occurring after Watergate being sensitive to the political climate of the 
time. Hagan & Palloni (1986) examine the impact of sentences for white-collar offenders 
both before and after Watergate, finding that post-Watergate, convicted white-collar 
offenders were more likely to be sentenced to prison, but receive shorter sentences than 
less educated persons convicted of common crimes. However, other studies find in the 
aftermath of Watergate, high status offenders become less likely to suffer severe 
punishment under criminal code (Hagan & Parker, 1985; Benson & Walker, 1988).  
Recently studies have sought to learn more about the factors influencing sentencing 
outcomes of white-collar offenders. Shanzenback & Yaeger (2005) find that financial 





larger fines also receiving shorter sentences. Thus, this evidence suggest an additional 
mechanism for which higher status offenders may avoid or reduce incarceration terms as 
some “defendants are able to trade fines for reductions in prison time” (Shanzenback & 
Yaeger, 2005: 790). Consequently, one’s ability to pay fines is an important factor to 
consider in explaining sentencing disparities, including racial disparities, which the authors 
conclude are largely mediated by the ability of different groups to pay fines, as well as 
other factors such as wealth. Thus, on average, “whites receive shorter sentences, in part, 
because they have a disproportionate ability to pay a fine” (p. 792). Further, Albonetti 
(1998, 1999) shows factors such as pleading guilty and increased case complexity are 
features that may intervene in the relationship between the characteristics of the offender 
and final sentencing outcomes. These studies illustrate the neglect of previous research on 
sentencing disparities to consider factors such as the role of fines, case complexity, and 
guilty pleas, parallels issues in traditional sentencing research, as a major weakness of the 
sentencing disparity literature is the production of estimates resulting from “poorly 
specified models of sentencing” (Wellford, 2007: 399).   
Holtfreter (2013) examines differential legal treatment among white-collar 
offenders based on gender. Using national survey data on white-collar crime, Holtfreter 
uses a focal concerns perspective to explain disparities in sentencing among white-collar 
offenders. Consistent with prior literature, the results find that women are limited in their 
role with white-collar crime based on restricted positions within the organization (see also 
Daly, 1989). However, the results did not provide evidence of gender-based leniency at 
sentencing and only provided partial evidence for the focal concerns perspective with only 





Similarly, Steffensmeier (2013) applies a gendered focal concerns and crime opportunities 
framework to predict female involvement in corporate criminal networks. The findings 
support the gendered paradigm that women are typically not part of white-collar criminal 
networks and when involved in such networks women typically had more minor roles and 
made less of a profit than their male conspirators. Thus, the findings indicate that in along 
with gendered labor market that limit women’s entry into employment positions, exclusion 
of women from corporate criminal networks is also present, which limits the opportunity 
for women to engage in significant white-collar crimes (see also Daly, 1989).  
In summary, prior research has offered mixed results about whether white-collar 
offenders receive preferential treatment in punishment outcomes. However, most research 
to date uses data from prior to the sentencing guidelines and looks only at a limited number 
of punishment outcomes including the probability of incarceration and the sentence length 
given incarceration. Consequently, previous scholarship provides little insight about the 
current state of punishment for white-collar offenders under sentencing guidelines and the 
way in which white-collar offenders are treated in comparison to street offenders across a 
variety of punishment processes and outcomes.  
Theoretical Perspective on Sentencing   
 
Sentencing research continues to explore the extent to which judicial decision 
making is dependent on a large variety of factors that are both related and unrelated to the 
matter in question and may vary across groups of offenders (Kramer & Ulmer, 1996; 
Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Kurlycheck & Johnson, 2010). To understand whether 
differential treatment exists in criminal sentencing between white-collar and street 





perspectives: focal concerns theory and typescript theory. These perspectives of 
punishment place emphasis on the ways characteristics of the crime, defendant, and the 
overall environment shape sentencing outcomes. Thus, the theoretical framework views 
the sentencing process as “a cognitive process in which information concerning the 
offender, the offense, and the surrounding circumstances is read, organized in relation to 
other information and integrated into an overall assessment of the case” (Hogarth, 1971: 
279). 
Focal Concerns Theory  
 
The focal concerns theory builds on the bounded rationality thesis (Albonetti 1991), 
which contends judges rarely have the full information needed to make rational decisions 
and in absence of perfect information, will rely on past experiences and stereotypes related 
present situation, which serve as perceptual short hands that reduce risk in sentencing 
decisions. Specifically, focal concerns theory argues that in light of having limited 
information, judges emphasize three focal concerns when making decisions: 
blameworthiness, community protection, and practical constraints and consequences 
(Steffensmeier et al., 1998). Although not originally developed in relation to white-collar 
crime, the focal concerns theory of legal decision-making can be applied to explain judicial 
decision-making among white-collar offenders. Further, Holtfreter (2013), notes that while 
prior literature on white-collar crime has rarely employed a focal concerns perspective, 
“studies of white-collar offender sentencing have produced findings that can be interpreted 
though this lens” (Holtfreter, 2013: 328). In this section, I will briefly explain the 
components of the focal concerns theory and ways in which the theory applies to this 





The blameworthiness principle contends a defendant’s punishment is directly 
influenced by the judge’s perceptions of the offender’s culpability and the damage caused. 
Accordingly, there is a positive relationship between the degree of blameworthiness and 
the final sentencing outcome, as offenders are seen as deserving of punishment because 
they have done something wrong and thus, society has a duty of punishing the offender 
proportionately to the seriousness of the offense (von Hirsh, 1976).  
In application to white-collar crime specifically, prior research finds certain legal 
factors, such as offense seriousness, criminal history, and measures of defendants’ 
culpability are associated with harsher punishment outcomes (Wheeler et al., 1982; Benson 
& Walker; Maddan et al., 2012; Holtfreter, 2013). For instance, Wheeler et al., (1982) 
found the key elements related to judges’ decisions to sentence white-collar offenders more 
severely included legally relevant factors associated with blameworthiness such as the 
seriousness of the harm, the dollar loss of victims, the complexity and sophistication of the 
offense, and the spread of the illegality over space. More recently, Holtfreter (2013) tested 
the focal concerns perspective among a sample of white-collar offenders and found 
sentencing severity was primarily shaped by indicators of the offenders’ blameworthiness, 
such as measures of crime seriousness. However, prior research has not specifically 
addressed whether being charged with a crime typically viewed as a white-collar offense 
rather than a street offense will affect the degree of blameworthiness attributed to the 
offender. 
Protection of the community concentrates on the perceived need to incapacitate an 
offender to prevent future harm. The logic follows a utilitarian philosophy, arguing the 





the issue of protecting the public and preventing future offending, but are provided limited 
information to predict whether or not the offender will recidivate. Consequently, judges 
must rely on information about the case, the offender’s prior criminal history, or 
characteristics of the offender to gage predictions about the offender’s likelihood of future 
offending.  
In general, judges may view those charged with white-collar crimes as less of a 
danger to the community than the traditional street offender, as white-collar offenders 
typically have characteristics such as higher social status and shorter criminal histories. For 
instance, in comparing the decision to incarcerate white-collar offenders as compared to 
more traditional street offenders a judge noted, “the decision is definitely tougher. You are 
not putting someone away in order to safeguard the rest of the community from physical 
harm when you are dealing with a white-collar case, so you simply do not put people away 
as you do when you are dealing with violent crimes” (Mann et al., 1979: 482). According 
to the perspective of protection of the community, factors indicating high social status, 
such as high education and income would be expected to signal to a judge a lower degree 
of danger to the community and a reduced likelihood of recidivism. Moreover, leniency 
toward white-collar criminals may be a result of judges perceiving white-collar offenders 
as less likely to reoffend or do future harm, as white-collar offenders are often viewed as 
being more rational actors (Weisburd et al., 1991, 1994).14 
Practical constraints and consequences focus on both organizational and individual 
factors that influence judicial decision-making. Regarding the individual offender, 
                                                            
14 Alternatively, it can be argued the perception of enhanced rationality may translate into more severe 
punishment, as decision makers view white-collar offenders as more highly rational, and as being more 





constraints generally refer to the concerns judges may consider regarding “the offender’s 
ability to do time, health condition, special needs, the costs to be borne to the correctional 
system, and the disruption of ties to children and other family members” (Steffensmeirer 
et al., 1998: 767).15  
Prior research has looked to the special treatment and needs of white-collar 
offenders as a reason for leniency in punishment as compared to the street criminal.  The 
“special sensitivity hypothesis” takes the perspective that judges view offenders of white-
collar crimes as disproportionally susceptible to the pains of prison as compared to street 
offenders. From this point of view, white-collar offenders are particularly vulnerable to an 
environment that transplants those of higher social status into a society perceived to be 
ruled and overly populated by poor, minority, hardened street criminals (Benson & Cullen, 
1988; Stadler et al., 2013). Thus, in employing discretion on what punishment to impose 
on white-collar offenders, judges may take into account the difficulty in adjusting to life in 
confinement and particular vulnerability to the harshness of imprisonment faced by the 
white-collar criminal. Furthermore, incapacitation for white-collar offenders may be 
viewed as unduly harsh as these individuals are seen as having more positive social capital 
to be lost through severe punishment. As put by one judge, “there is no getting away from 
the fact that the type of existence that jail provides is more hard on people who are 
accustomed to the better existence than it is on people who may not be fed as well in their 
homes as they are in jail”  (Mann et al., 1979: 487). 
                                                            
15 Organization constraints include the courts caseload and need to ensure a flow of cases, desire to maintain 
a working relationship with the courtroom workgroup, and the costs to the criminal justice system such as 
resource expenditures and correctional crowding. However, this study does not test the influence of 





Taken together prior research and the focal concerns theory of sentencing support 
the notion that judges are likely to be influenced by characteristics of the case and the 
offender. Under the focal concerns perspective, this study proposes that despite changes to 
sentencing guidelines that have sought to equate levels of punishment among 
embezzlement and larceny at the federal level, being charged with a white-collar offense 
rather than a street offense will serve as a signal to decision-makers that the defendant is 
less of a danger to society and less capable of serving time in prison therefore.16 
Specifically, I expect the following:  
 Hypothesis 1: Net of other factors, embezzlement offenders in comparison to 
larceny offenders will be punished less severely across all punishment outcomes.  
 
Typescript Theory  
 
Typescript theory contends that all individuals in society have ascribed or achieved 
characteristics based on identifiable traits, such as gender, race, and socioeconomic status. 
These characteristics are called a “type.” Additionally, each “type” entails a “script”, which 
are socially approved behaviors that the specific individual (or specific type) is expected to 
follow. Thus, these typescripts form behavioral cues which serve as the basis for the shared 
expectations amongst those in society as to which behavior to expect from different classes 
of individuals (Harris, 1977; Harris & Hill, 1986). Harris & Hill (1986) describe these 
typescripts as essentially conveying information about the behavior or actions to be 
expected from a person in a given scenario.  
                                                            
16 Employing signaling theory from labor economics, this argument purports that the charge brought against 
you can play an important role in the way a defendant is perceived by judges even if this does not have a 
casual impact on the outcomes of the preceding (Spence, 1973; Bushway & Apel, 2012). In the current study, 
the application of signaling theory is used to further the argument that having a white-collar charge versus a 
charge of a street crime is a signal that judges will use in determining punishment. Specifically, the signal of 





Aside from defining socially accepted normal behaviors, typescripts also define 
expectations of deviant behavior. Those who fail to abide by their expected typescript are 
often viewed as countertypes. In relation to criminal behavior, Sealock and Simpson 
(1998), for instance, argue the archetypal countertype for delinquent involvement would 
involve a white female from a well-to-do socioeconomic background (see also Harris et 
al., 1985). Under this view, in relation to white-collar crime, the middle class white-collar 
offender with a stable job and family does not fit the social expectation as a criminal, which 
is the typescript characteristically reserved for the stereotypical street-level offender, who 
is a young, minority, male, of low socioeconomic status, and therefore the white-collar 
offender may constitute a “countertype” in the view of criminal justice decision makers.  
Regarding the decision to punish, typescript theory suggests that the severity of 
punishment will vary across stages of criminal justice processing. Such a relationship is 
hypothesized to occur as rational decision makers operating in a realm of uncertainty will 
seek to maximize the subjective utility and minimize subjective disutility and such 
decisions may be influenced and even biased by the decision-makers interpretation of the 
offenders’ typescript (Harris & Hill, 1986).17 This perspective in part relates to the concept 
that different stages of punishment correspond with varying levels of the perceived 
subjective disutility that the punishment will have on the offender. Accordingly, different 
types of offenders (embezzlement and larceny) are subject to sanctions that are in 
accordance with the degrees of subjective disutility for the particular actor at each specific 
                                                            
17 This discussion requires the defining of a number of concepts as viewed by typescripts theory. In this 
context rationality is “what is considered rational from the viewpoint of the decision maker”. Subjective 
expected utility refers to “the perceived utility of choice weighted by the subjectively estimated probability 
of obtaining that utility if the choice were actually made.” Subjective disutility refers to the assumption that 
“it is possible to assume… that a choice may involve a dis-incentive value or subjective expected disutility. 
It is sometimes assumed that the minimization of subjective expected disutility is the key rule in decision 





stages of punishment. Under this view, the harshest punishments will be reserved for the 
offender that is perceived to be more severe and have committed crimes constituting a 
greater degree of harm, for whom, a more severe punishment will be necessary to enhance 
the degree of subjective disutility experienced by the punishment.  
For instance, this model contends early in the criminal justice process, when an 
offender first appears in the criminal justice system, a countertype, such as a middle class 
white-collar offender is not likely to appear as a particular threat as they are not associated 
with the stereotypical deviant and as such a judges best estimate of the subjective disutility 
the offender will experience will correspond to a lower level of deprivation. Instead at the 
early stages, the harshest punishment is reserved for those typescripts that are associated 
with deviant behavior, such as those charged with an offense seen as a street crime. 
However, proceeding to the later stages of the criminal process, the calculus of the judge 
will change, and as it becomes increasingly rare to see a deviant countertype receive 
conviction and advance to the sentencing stage, the white-collar offender is viewed as a 
greater threat and as a result greater degrees of deprivation via more severe punishment are 
warranted. Thus, the application of typescript theory contends the differences in the degree 
of punishment severity between white-collar and street offenders is dependent upon the 
stage of punishment, with a white-collar offender who reaches the sentencing stage being 
more likely to stand out as a countertype and merit a more punitive form of punishment 
(Harris & Hill, 1986; Hill, et al., 1985).18  
                                                            
18 Although not originally developed to explain variations in punishment among white-collar and street 
offenders, the typescript theory has been expanded to several different populations. Originally, Harris’s 
(1977) typescript theory primarily focused on the relationship of gender and adult criminal behavior. Hill et 
al., (1985) further extended this theory to explain disparities in the processing of juvenile offenders. Sealock 
& Simpson (1998) used the theory to explain police decisions to arrest juvenile offenders. This study further 
expands on typescript theory by applying this perspective to explain variation in sentencing outcomes among 





In the current discussion, the focus is on the crime type as the key element defining 
the typescript, where it is expected that being charged with embezzlement, regardless of 
other status characteristics such as gender, race, and class will directly influence the 
characterization as a countertype and subsequently affect punishment outcomes across 
various stages of the criminal justice process. However, typescripts theory also suggests 
that factors such as gender, race, and social class are associated with who is viewed as a 
typical offender and a countertype (Harris & Hill, 1986), as well as how these status 
characteristics may mediate the types of crimes that blacks and whites or males and females 
are expected to commit and what happens when the offender deviates from these 
expectations (see Sealock & Simpson, 1998). While this research views the crime type as 
the key element to be focused on, future research may also place emphasis on the 
interaction between the offense and offender status characteristics. For instance, future 
research should address the question of whether punishment outcomes varies if the white-
collar offender is black or white, male or female, high or low socioeconomic status. 
In summary, an application of typescript theory to white-collar crime contends that 
being charged and being subsequently convicted and sentenced of a white-collar crime 
leads to a label as a countertype and the punishment associated with this countertype 
becomes increasingly severe as an offender progresses through the criminal justice system. 
Therefore, using typescript theory I expect the following:   
 Hypothesis 2: Net of other factors, at the early processing stage of pretrial 
detainment embezzlement offenders in comparison to larceny offenders will be less 
likely to receive pretrial detention  
 Hypothesis 3: Net of other factors, at the later sentencing stages of embezzlement 
offenders in comparison to larceny offenders will be punished more severely across 
all outcomes. 






Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
 
Sentencing in Federal Context  
 
 Sentencing research at the federal level is distinguished by a number of unique 
characteristics. The federal system contains 94 separate district courts, within 11 circuits 
that cover the entire United States, as well as several foreign territories. As compared to 
state courts, the federal system is not only large, but also handles different types of 
caseloads, with dockets more heavily composed of immigration, narcotics, fraud, and 
weapons offenses.  
Moreover, sentencing at the federal level is administered through a separate set of 
federal sentencing guidelines. The federal guidelines were originally drafted to limit the 
discretion given to judges and reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities by implementing 
a rigid system of punishment outcomes based on offense levels and prior criminal history, 
along with the possibility for aggravating and mitigating sentencing adjustments. While 
the sentencing guidelines vastly limited the discretion available to judges that was available 
under the previous system of indeterminate sentencing, some discretion is still provided 
the federal judges. For instance, federal punishments are based on “real offense” 
sentencing, which allows judges to consider relevant conduct or actual offense behavior 
during the sentencing process (Tonry, 1996).19 Under real offense sentencing, judge may 
consider as an aside from the seriousness of the conviction offense, conduct that landed the 
defendant in court including “uncharged conduct, acquitted conduct, conduct in dismissed 
                                                            
19 Real offense sentencing was adopted by the U.S. Sentencing Commission as a measure to reduce 





counts, and conduct of coconspirators” (Wilmont & Spohn, 2004: p. 325). Thus, under real 
offense sentencing, “sentences can be influenced by virtually any information about the 
offense or the offender [and] the decision about what factors to emphasize and how much 
weight to give to those facts rest with each sentencing judge” (Yellen, 2005: p. 267). 
Additionally, the potential for discretion was expanded in the United States v. Booker, in 
which the United States Supreme Court ruled that the mandatory nature of the federal 
guidelines violated the 6th Amendment right to jury trial, as it enabled the sentencing of 
offenders for crimes not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, the Court struck 
down the mandatory component of the federal guidelines and instructed federal judges to 
consider the guidelines as advisory (see United States v. Booker/FanFan 543 U.S. 220, 264 
(2005)). 
Data 
This study uses federal criminal sentencing data from the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC) for fiscal years 2008-2010.20 The data contain information about 
defendants in criminal cases filed in United States Federal District Court, who were 
sentenced under the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984, and 
subsequently reported to the United States Sentencing Commission by U.S. district courts 
and U.S. magistrates.21 The dataset also contains additional variables added for research 
purposes by the United States Sentencing Commission’s Office of Policy Analysis’. The 
USSC data contain detailed information, including variables from the Judgment and 
Conviction order (J&C), information on the defendants background collected from the 
                                                            
20 Data from the Federal Justice Statistics Program are available from fiscal years 1994-2010. The present 
study only uses the three most recent years available at the time of the analysis (2008-2010).  
21 The data are compiled by the Urban Institute and Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and maintained by the 





presentencing report, as well as variables regarding defendant and case characteristics 
including, criminal history and basic demographic information. Given the wealth of 
information available, scholars have noted the USSC data to be “arguably one of the richest 
data sources available for studying criminal sentencing” (O’Neill & Johnson, 2010: 407; 
see also Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).  
 The current sample includes data from 94 federal districts resulting in a total sample 
size of 4,210 embezzlement and larceny cases in federal district court. For the analysis of 
guideline departures, the sample is limited to cases that are eligible to receive discounts 
(Johnson, 2005; Johnson & Betsinger, 2009). Therefore, cases in zone A of the guidelines 
are excluded, as these cases are unable to receive departures resulting in a total sample of 
2,908 cases (See Appendix D). For analyses with sentence length, only those who received 
an incarceration sentence are analyzed, resulting in a sample of 1,701 cases.  Below I 
present a description of the variables used to analyze sentencing disparities. Table 1, 







Table 1: Variable Definitions, USSC Data, FY 2008-2010 
Variable  Coding Scheme Description 
Dependent Variables    
Pretrial detainment 1 = detained Dummy indicator for offenders 
detained prior to trial  
Substantial assistance 
departure 
1 = yes Offender received 5K1.1 downward 
departure for substantial assistance 
to government  




1 = incarceration Offender sentenced to incarceration 
Ln financial sanction  
 
Log (total dollar) Natural logarithm of the dollar 
amount of fine/cost of supervision, 
and restitution ordered on the 
defendant 
Ln sentence length Log (months) Natural logarithm of the total 
number of months of imprisonment 
(capped at 470) 
Distance from 
Presumptive  
Months Offenders actual Sentence – 
offenders presumptive Sentence. 
Offense Types   
White-collar offense 
 
1 = white-collar offense Dummy indicator for whether the 
offender was charged with 
embezzlement or larceny.  
Control Variables   
Presumptive sentence Months 
 
Adjusted minimum months of 
incarceration recommended by the 
guidelines (capped at 470) 
Ln presumptive 
sentence 
Log (months) Natural logarithm of adjusted 
minimum months of incarceration 
recommended by the guidelines 
(capped at 470) 
Criminal history USSC scale United States Sentencing 
Commission scale rating prior 
criminal history from 1 to 6 
Pretrial detainment 1 = detained Dummy indicator for offenders 






Table 1: Continued 
Variable  Coding Scheme Description 
Guilty plea 1 = plead guilty  Dummy indicator for whether 
offender was convicted by guilty 
plea or trial.  
Multiple Counts of 
Conviction  
1 = multiple Dummy indicator for offenders 
convicted of multiple offenses 
Race/ethnicity  4 dummy variables Dummy indicator for white, black, 
and Hispanic, race unkown/missing 
Male 1 = male Dummy indicator if defendant is 
male 
Age Years Continuous measure of age of 
offender at time of sentencing  
U.S. Citizen 
  
1 = U.S. Citizen Dummy indicator of whether the 
offender is a U.S. citizen  
Education 
 
4 dummy variables Level of defendant’s educational 
attainment at time of sentencing 
measured as: less than high school, 
high school graduate, some college, 
and college graduate, education 
missing 
Financial dependents  
  
1 = dependents Dummy indicator for offender with 
financial dependents (missing data 
are coded as 0) 
Sentence year 3 dummy variable Dummy indicator for sentence year, 
with 2008 the reference category 
 
Dependent Variables  
 
I examine disparities in punishment among the sample of embezzlement and 
larceny across a variety of outcomes including: pretrial detainment, federal guideline 
departures, incarceration, financial sanctions, sentence length and distance from the 
presumptive sentence. Pretrial detainment is coded as a dummy indicator of whether the 
offender was in detention prior to sentence. Downward departures in federal guidelines 





in the investigation or prosecution of other federal cases are eligible for departures under 
federal rule 5K1.1. Second, judges retain the discretion to sentence offenders outside the 
recommendations of the guidelines. Downward departures will be assessed using a 
multinomial outcome in order to distinguish from substantial assistance departures, 
downward departures, upward departures, and a reference group of no departure (see 
Johnson & Betsinger, 2009).22    
In/Out is coded as a dummy variable, indicating a value of 1 if the offender is 
sentenced to any length of confinement and coded as 0 for any alternative sentence not 
involving a period of incarceration in a federal prison (probation, fine or restitution, 
alternative confinement, ect.). Financial sanctions encompass all monetary punishments 
imposed on the offender at time of sentencing, including fines, restitution, and all court 
fees and costs. As the distribution has a positive skew, I assess the financial sanctions 
outcome by using the natural logarithm. Sentence length is a continuous measure of the 
months an offender is sentenced to incarceration.23  As the distribution of sentence length 
has a positive skew, I report the analysis as the natural logarithm of sentence months. 
Distance from presumptive sentence is a continuous variable and is coded as the difference 
between the actual number of months of incarceration that the offender is ordered to serve 
in an incarceration facility and the number of months of incarceration recommended by the 
presumptive sentence.24  
                                                            
22 To date there are no known studies that explicitly measure guideline departures as a punishment outcome 
among a sample of white-collar offenders. However, sentencing literature focusing on traditional street 
offenders commonly uses guideline departures as an outcome variable to model decision making in federal 
criminal proceedings (see Albonetti, 1997; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; Johnson et al., 2008; Johnson & 
Betsinger, 2009).  
23 Following U.S. Sentence Commission guidelines length of confinement is capped at 470 months (i.e. life 
imprisonment is coded as 470 months).  







To compare sentencing outcomes between these two groups of offenders, this study 
measures white-collar offenders as those charged with embezzlement and street offenders 
as those charged with larceny or theft. White-collar offense is measured as a dummy 
indicator of whether the primary offense was with either embezzlement or larceny. Both 
embezzlement and larceny are broad categories that encompass a number of specific 
offense charges within the label. Table 2 displays the disaggregated distribution of offense 
types and number of offenders in either the white-collar offender or street offender 
category. The disaggregated distribution will be examined separately in later analyses.  
 
Table 2: Summary of Disaggregated Offense Types 
Offense Type Obs. Percentage 
Embezzlement Offenses (White-Collar)   
     Bank Embezzlement 387 27.49 
     Postal Embezzlement 467 33.17 
     Embezzles of Public Money and Properties  45 3.20 
     Embezzlement – Lending, Credit, Insurance 72 5.11 
     Embezzlement – Veterans Relief  5 .36 
     Embezzle- Government Officer or Employee 8 .57 
     Embezzlement – Other 424 30.11 
    Total Embezzlement  1,408  
Larceny Offenses (Street)    
    Larceny & theft – Bank 145 5.17 
    Larceny & theft – Postal 618 22.06 
    Larceny & theft – Interstate Commerce 87 3.10 
    Theft of U.S. Property 1,869 66.70 
    Theft of Maritime Property 65 2.32 
    Larceny & theft – Other Felony 18 .64 







Control Variables  
 
I take into account a number of legal and demographic factors that have been found 
to be associated with sentencing outcomes by prior research. To control for legally relevant 
considerations under sentencing guidelines, I control for presumptive sentence length, 
which is the minimum number of months of incarceration recommended by the sentencing 
guidelines and adjusted for mandatory minimums. Presumptive sentence takes into account 
the 43-point offense severity scaled and the 6-point criminal history scale, as well as 
accounts for sentencing adjustments (see Engen & Gainey, 2000; Hofer & Blackwell, 
2001). In line with prior research, and per the recommendations of the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission I also include an additional control for the offender’s 6-point criminal history 
score (see Ulmer, 2000; United States Sentencing Commission, 2006; Johnson et al., 2008; 
Johnson & Betsinger, 2009). Pretrial detainment is coded as a binary variable and 
measured as whether the defendant was detained in-custody prior to trial. I also include a 
dummy variable for observations where pretrial detainment status is missing. Multiple 
counts of conviction are coded as a dummy indicator for whether the offender was 
convicted on more than one charge. Guilty plea is coded as a dummy variable to indicate 
whether to offender was convicted through a guilty plea or a trial.25 Financial sanctions is 
coded as a continuous variable rounded to the nearest whole dollar and is included in the 
model as prior research has found financial sanctions to be a key mediating variable in 
white-collar crime sentencing research (Schanzenbach & Yaeger, 2006).  
I also control for several demographic factors related to the offender. Race/ethnicity 
is coded as series of dummy variables indicating whether the offender is white, black, 
                                                            





Hispanic or other race.26 A dummy variable is also included for cases where the offenders’ 
race is missing or is unknown. Age is measured at the time of sentencing and is coded as a 
continuous variable. Male is a dummy indicator for male offenders. U.S. Citizen is a 
dummy variable that measures whether the offender is a U.S. citizen. A dummy variable is 
included for citizenship cases that are missing. Educational attainment is coded as three 
dummy variables indicating whether the highest level of education was high school 
graduate, some college, and college graduate, with less than high school graduate serving 
as the reference category.27 An additional dummy variable is included for whether the 
offenders’ educational status was missing or unknown. Financial dependent is a dummy 
indicator of whether the offender claims any financial dependents (excluding self). Year is 
coded as a series of dummy indicators for the year in which the offender was sentenced.  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics examining for the full sample, as well as the 
sample disaggregated by embezzlement and larceny offenders. In the sample there are 
1,408 embezzlement cases and 2,802 larceny cases totaling 4,210 cases in the full sample. 
Between the samples there is variation across punishment outcomes. For instance, at the 
early stage of pretrial detainment there are 32 percent of larceny cases that are detained 
compared to just 15 percent of embezzlement cases. However, comparing across the 
decision to incarcerate, white-collar offenders are more frequently incarcerated with 
approximately 44 percent of embezzlement offenders being sentenced to prison, whereas 
38 percent of offenders convicted of larceny faced prison. Furthermore, among white-collar 
                                                            
26 Other race include Asian, American Indian, Multi-Racial, or Non-US American Indian 
27 Technical, military, vocational training, and course work at community colleges are coded as Some 





offenders, the average length of sentence was slightly more than 2.74 logged months, 
significantly greater than larceny offenders who had an average of 2.62 logged months.  
Regarding control variables across both of offenders the majority are U.S. citizens, 
male, and white. White-collar offenders are slightly older, and are more likely to be female, 
white, claim financial dependents, and have lower criminal history scores, than larceny 
offenders, on average. Additionally, there are large differences in the levels of education 
between the two groups. Offenders with less than a high school education are more highly 
concentrated as street offenders, with 40 percent having less than a high school diploma 
versus only 13 percent among white-collar offenders. Further, embezzlement offenders are 
more highly educated with 17 percent having graduated college, compared to only 9 
percent of larceny offenders.  




























Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, FY 2008-2010  
 
Full Sample 
(n = 4,210) 
Embezzlement 
(n = 1,408) 
Larceny 
(n = 2,802) 
Variable   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Pretrial Detainment  
(N = 4,182) 
.26 .44 .15* .36 .32* .47 
Substantial assistance 
departure 
(N = 2,908) 
.05 .22 .07* .26 .05* .23 
Downward departure 
(N = 2,908) 
.25 .43 .35* .48 .26* .44 
Incarceration 
(N = 4,210) 
.40 .49 .44* .50 .38* .49 
Ln financial sanction 
(N = 3,599) 
1.34 1.15 1.53* 1.38 1.25* .99 
Ln sentence length 
(N = 1,701) 
2.67 .83 2.74* .90 2.62* .79 
Distance from Presumptive  
(N = 4,210)  
-2.91 7.90 -4.13* 8.75 -2.48* 7.62 
Control Variables       
Presumptive sentence 10.65 14.85 13.64* 19.15 9.16* 11.87 
Ln presumptive sentence 1.74 1.31 1.89* 1.4 1.67* 1.25 
Criminal history  1.68 1.37 1.11* .48 1.97* 1.57 
Pretrial detainment .26 .44 .15* .36 .32* .47 
Pretrial detainment info 
missing 
.02 .13 .01 .12 .01 .10 
Guilty plea .97 .18 .95* .22 .98* .15 
Counts of conviction .17 .38 .17 .38 .17 .38 
Ln financial sanction 1.14 1.16 1.33* 1.39 1.05* 1.02 
No departure .68 .47 .64* .48 .69* .46 
Upward departure .02 .14 .01* .08 .03* .16 
Substantial assistance 
departure 
.04 .20 .05* .22 .04* .19 
Downward departure .20 .40 .24* .43 .18* .38 
Departure information 
missing 
.01 .08 .00* .03 .01* .06 
White .52 .50 .62* .49 .48* .50 
Black .29 .46 .20* .40 .34* .48 
Hispanic  .10 .30 .07* .26 .11* .32 
Other Race .06 .24 .10* .30 .05* .21 









Table 3: Continued  
 
Full Sample 
(n = 4,210) 
Embezzlement 
(n = 1,408) 
Larceny 
(n = 2,802) 
Variable   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Male .55 .50 .49* .50 .58* .49 
Age 42.46 12.81 43.29* 11.7 42.06* 13.32 
U.S. Citizen .96 .19 .98* .13 .95* .22 
U.S. Citizen info Missing .01 .11 .01 .09 .01 .08 
Less than high school .31 .46 .13* .35 .40* .49 
HS Graduate .26 .44 .30* .46 .24* .43 
Some College Education .30 .46 .39* .49 .26* .44 
College Graduate .11 .32 .17* .37 .09* .28 
Education information missing  .02 .15 .02* .12 .02* .13 
Dependents .56 .50 .62* .49 .54* .50 
Year dummies - - - - - - 
*Indicates difference between embezzlement and larceny categories is statistically 
significant at the p < .05 level 
SD = Standard Deviation  
 
Analytic Strategy  
 
The subsequent analysis will proceed in the following stages. First, as typescript 
theory hypothesizes differential punishment outcomes dependent upon the stage of 
sentencing, I begin by analyzing the early process decision of pretrial detainment through 
a logistic regression. Next, I turn to the actual sentencing stage and model several outcomes 
of interest. For the analyses of downward and substantial assistance departures, I use a 
multinomial logistic regression. This method enables the separate comparison of the 
likelihood of receiving each type of downward departure compared to receiving no 
departure (see Johnson & Betsinger, 2009).28  
                                                            
28 Federal departures can occur both above and below the guidelines recommendations, therefore, the 
multinomial logistic regression estimates a four-category model (substantial assistance, downward departure, 
upward departure, and no departure). However, similar to method used by Johnson & Betsinger (2009), I 
only report the outcomes for the downward departures as upward departures occur in less than 1 percent of 





Next, the decision to sentence can be broken down into either a one-stage or a two-
stage process. In the two-stage process, sentencing is modeled first by the decision of 
whether or not to incarcerate, and, second the length of imprisonment given incarceration 
(Wheeler et al., 1982). This approach is widely used in prior research for sentencing of 
white-collar offenders (Wheeler et al., 1982; Hagan & Paker, 1985; Hagan & Palloni, 
1986), as well as criminal sentencing research more generally (Steffensmeier, 1998; Ulmer 
& Johnson, 2004; see also Bushway et al., 2007).29 However, Bushway & Piehl (2001) 
argue that the assumption of sentencing occurring in two separate stages became 
substantially less valid after the introduction of presumptive sentencing guidelines and 
instead recommend modeling both the decision to incarcerate and sentence length together 
through use of a Tobit model (Stolzenberg & Relles, 1997; Albonetti, 1997; Bushway & 
Piehl, 2001; Kurlycheck & Johnson, 2004). In sum, the two approaches differ in the 
assumptions about the sentencing process. The assumption of the Tobit analysis is the 
judges use the same processes to decide the incarceration decision, as well as sentence 
length. In contrast, the two stage-processes assume the processes may not be the same. 
This study relies primarily on the two-stage model, but also uses a Tobit analysis 
as an alternative method (see Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000; Steffensmeier & Demuth 
2001). The decision to rely primarily on the two-stage model is based on the following 
reasoning.30 First, this is an exploratory study to understand disparities in sentencing 
outcomes among white-collar offenders and comparable street offenders under 
                                                            
29 The conceptual basis to model sentencing as a two-stage process grew out of interviews conducted with 
federal judges in the Yale Studies on White-Collar, which revealed that judges viewed sentencing as a two-
stage process. For instance, wheeler et al., (1982) contended that “the first and hardest decision the judge 
makes is whether the person will go to prison or not” and secondly a judge must make a qualitatively 
different decision related to how long the offender should be incarcerated. (Wheeler et al., 1982: 642). 
30 Ulmer and Johnson (2004), note the decision to model based on either a one-stage or two-stage process 





contemporary sentencing guidelines. As such, it is important to assess whether factors 
differentially impact the decision to incarcerate, as well as the sentence length given 
incarceration. Second, past research and perspectives of white-collar crime punishment, 
such as the special sensitivity hypothesis, explicitly contend that the decision to incarcerate 
white-collar offenders is of heightened concern for judges (Mann, 1985, Wheeler et al., 
1988; Stadler et al., 2013). Thus, as this study aims to understand how punishment severity 
differs across the samples of white-collar and street offenders for different punishment 
outcomes, I proceed by separately analyzing the decision to incarcerate and sentence length 
given incarceration. 
 Following the two-stage process, I first model the binary outcomes of whether the 
offender was sentenced to a period of incarceration using a logisitic regression analysis.  
Next, I model sentence length in months for subsample of those sentenced to prison using 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS). As the distribution of sentence length is positively 
skewed I use the natural logarithm in analyzes (Wheeler et al., 1982). I also assess the 
sentencing outcome for financial sanctions, which can be modeled using OLS. The 
outcome is logged to reduce skew, the results can be interpreted as the percent change in 
the dependent variable associated with a 1-unit change in the independent variable. 
Using the two-stage method, sampling bias becomes an issue as the sample of 
offenders who are sentenced to incarceration is likely a nonrandom subset of the 
population. Consequently, coefficients from estimates on sentence length may be biased. 
As a sensitivity analysis, I follow the procedure recommended by Bushway et al., (2007) 
to determine the costs and benefits of using Heckman’s (1976) correction for selection bias. 





the Heckman Two-Step procedure. The collinearity diagnostic for the model including the 
lambda term reported a condition index = 38.23 exceeding the recommended ranges for 
collinearity. Ultimately, this suggests that the uncorrected estimates from the simple two-
part model are preferable. 
 Finally, I include an alternative measurement of sentencing severity by creating a 
new variable that takes the difference of the actual sentence length given to the offender 
and the presumptive sentence. This new variable provides a measure of distance judges 
deviate from the presumptive sentence and provides several advantages. Using this new 
measure is advantageous as it allows cases to remain in the modeling of sentence length 
imposed on the offender and provides a standardized outcome to compare white-collar and 
street offenders by showing whether judges deviate further from the presumptive sentence 
for either group. The difference from the presumptive guidelines is a continuous variable 
and is normally distributed allowing the use of ordinary least squares regression (See 
Appendix E). The coefficients can be interpreted as a 1-unit increase in the independent 
variable corresponding to the amount in the months the offender is sentenced above or 
below the presumptive guideline recommendations.  
Table 4a and Table 4b report the results for the full sample across all outcomes. 
The findings demonstrate that differences in the severity of punishment between 
embezzlement and larceny offenders vary across outcomes. For instance, in accordance 
with hypothesis 2, at the earlier stage of criminal justice processing, white-collar offenders 
are treated more leniently compared to larceny offenders, being 29 percent less likely to be 
detained prior to sentencing. Generally, this finding may be the result of several factors. 





criminal justice process, street offenders, as compared to the white-collar offenders, are 
perceived to be of greater threat and thus, are more likely to face detention. In support of 
this theory, Appendix F shows that embezzlement offenders are significantly more likely 
to be released on their own recognizance (RoR), with 25 percent of embezzlement 
offenders, but just 19 percent of larceny offenders receiving a RoR release. Moreover, these 
results may in part be explained by the ability to afford or obtain bail. Appendix F shows 
57 percent of embezzlement offenders are released on bail/bond, whereas only 47 percent 
of larceny offenders are granted a bail/bond release.31 This difference in the ability to obtain 
bail can be partly explained by the differences in individual characteristics across the two 
samples of offenders. While the current sample lacks data on income and employment, the 
sample of white-collar offenders are better educated. Additionally, in order to commit 
embezzlement the offender must have been employed at the time of the offense. As both 
employment and higher education are factors that are logically correlated with higher 
income, it may be plausible that the sample of white-collar offenders are more able to 
obtain bail than the larceny offenders and are therefore less likely to face pretrial 
detainment.  
Next, turning to the later stages of criminal processing, the results suggest the 
relationship between white-collar status and punishment severity changes upon the 
outcomes of interest. The results of the multinomial logistic regression for downward 
departures report no statistically significant difference in the decision to grant substantial 
                                                            
31  Under United States Code 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) a judicial officer may release a defendant upon their own 
personal recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured bond “unless the judicial officer determines that 
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety 






assistance or downward departures across either embezzlement or larceny offenders. While 
the coefficient for embezzlement offenders is positive in both models, indicating 
embezzlement offenders are more likely to receive both substantial assistance and judicial 
downward departures, the relationship is not statistically significant. Accordingly, the 
findings are inconclusive as to whether there is differential treatment for substantial 
assistance or judicial downward departures.  
On the decision of incarceration, embezzlement offenders are treated more 
punitively, with the results showing embezzlement offenders to be 33 percent more likely 
to be incarcerated than larceny offenders. Thus, these results support the hypothesis 3, as 
typescript theory suggests those charged with a white-collar offense, who appear at later 
stages of criminal justice processing are most likely to stand out as countertype and be 
viewed as a greater threat or more serious offenders; thus, will warrant more severe 
punishment.  
To model sentencing severity for those convicted, I use three measures. First, using 
an ordinary least squares regression on the natural logarithm of financial sanction, I find 
white-collar offenders receive significantly lower financial penalties than larceny 
offenders, with results showing being convicted of embezzlement corresponds to a 14 
percent decrease in the dollar amount of financial sanction compared to those convicted of 
larceny. Next, turning to the OLS model of the natural logarithm of sentence length on the 
subsample of those who received a period of incarceration this study finds no significant 
difference in the sentence length between embezzlement and larceny offenders.32  
                                                            
32 I repeat these analyses through the use of the tobit model. Appendix C show results are substantively the 
same for the outcome of financial sanction. For the outcome of sentence length the tobit model suggests a 





Finally, using a measure of distance from the presumptive sentence, I find 
embezzlement offenders are significantly more likely to receive sentences that are higher 
than the presumptive sentence recommendation. The results of the OLS model show 
embezzlement offenders are sentenced, on average, .38 months longer than the 
presumptive sentence range. Thus, while the results did not show a significant difference 
between embezzlement and larceny offenders across downward departures from 
sentencing guidelines, the findings imply that judges are more likely to sentence 
embezzlement offenders above the presumptive sentence recommendations.  
In sum, differences in sentencing severity for embezzlement offenders compared to 
larceny offenders varies across the type of punishment outcome observed, with some 
outcomes revealing positive, negative, or null effects. While the application of focal 
concerns theory projects a consistent negative relationship of having a white-collar charge 
and punishment outcomes, the model does not support hypothesis 1 as several measures 
find a significant positive relationship. However, typescript theory receives partial support 
as white-collar offenders treated more leniently at the early stage or presentence detention 
and more harshly in the decision for incarceration and distance from presumptive sentence. 
However, typescript theory fails to explain the analogous finding that larceny offenders 
receive financial sanctions that are significantly greater than embezzlement offenders.   
Results presented in Tables 4a and 4b also present an interesting pattern regarding 
the effect of legal and extralegal characteristics on outcomes. For instance, in previous 
research,  Schanzenbach & Yaeger (2006) found that observed racial disparities in prison 
sentences for white-collar offenders are largely the result of the offenders’ ability to pay 
                                                            
significance level is driven by the significant positive effect of probability of incarceration, which is also has 





fines.  Using data on sentencing from federal criminal courts the authors found that paying 
a fine significantly reduces the amount of prison time, and that whites received 
disproportionately shorter prison times largely due to the ability of this group to afford 
fines. However, the current study presents findings that conflict with these results. In 
particular, the imposition of financial sanctions did not significantly reduce the amount of 
prison time received.  Moreover, the current study also finds that the sample of 
embezzlement offenders received significantly lower financial sanctions than larceny 
offenders during the years 2008-2010.33 It is possible that the results between these two 
studies diverge for a number of reasons. First, the current study uses data from 2005-2007 
and 2008-2010, whereas Schanzenbach & Yaeger use data from 1992-2001, and as a result 
the findings may represent a trend over time where the ability to pay fines matters less in 
mediating sentencing severeity. Second, the current study uses data on all financial 
sanctions, whereas Schanzenbach & Yaeger only account for fines. Finally, this study is a 
comparison between embezzlement and larceny offenders, whereas Schanzenbach & 
Yaeger focus on disparities within white-collar offenders only. Still, despite these 
differences in the two studies, the divergence in findings bring to light an important 
contradiction, and as a result future research should continue to explore the link between 
financial sanctions and sentencing among white-collar offenders, as well as other groups 
of offenders more generally.  
Regarding the effect of demographic characteristics the results show the effects of 
race vary across different punishment outcomes. In comparison to the reference group of 
                                                            
33 In FY 2005-2007, there was no statistically significant difference in the amount of fines between 





black offenders, the results show both white and Hispanic offenders are significantly more 
likely to be detained before trial, and more likely to be sentenced to a period of 
incarceration. Further, Hispanic offenders are also significantly more likely to receive 
longer prison sentences, on average, compared to black offenders. However, across 
measures of downward departures, financial sanctions, and difference from the 
presumptive sentence, the results show no significant difference across racial and ethnic 
groups. Further, legally relevant factors also show a strong influence on offender outcomes. 
Criminal history score exhibits a significant positive association with the likelihood of 
pretrial detainment, being sentenced to incarceration, sentence length, and the difference 
from the presumptive sentence. However, criminal history score also has a negative 
relationship with the amount of financial sanctions, possibly indicating that those with 
greater prior criminal involvement are more likely to be incarcerated instead of receiving 



























































































































































































     




















































































































Observations 4,182 2,908 2,908 4,210 
R2/Model Fit 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District 














































































































































    








































































































Observations 3,599 1,701 4,210 
R2/Model Fit 0.54 0.74 0.56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District 












Offense Specific Analyses  
 
 As demonstrated in Table 2, there are a number of specific offenses embedded 
within the categories of embezzlement and larceny offenders.  For instance, Table 2 
displays the distribution of offenses across both embezzlement and larceny offenses. 
Among the larceny category there are seven specific offenses, however, the three most 
frequently appearing types of embezzlement composes over 90 percent of the sample: 
postal embezzlement (33%), other embezzlement (30%), and bank embezzlement (27%). 
Similarly, among the larceny category there are six specific offense types. The modal 
category is theft of U.S. property, which makes up over 66 percent of the sample. 
Additionally, there is a high frequency of postal theft cases (22%). To assess the sensitivity 
of main results to specific types of offenses included in the crime categories of 
embezzlement and larceny, I run additional analysis by omitting specific offense types 
from embezzlement and larceny categories.  
 Table 5 displays the mean and standard deviation across all punishment outcomes 
for the disaggregated offense types. The table highlights the large degree of variation in 
outcomes both across different offenses and the outcome variables. Generally, among the 
embezzlement offenses, bank embezzlement and lending & credit embezzlement warrant 
the harshest outcomes on incarceration decision, sentence length, and financial sanctions. 
However, these offenses are also among the most likely to receive downward departures 
and receive sentences that are below the presumptive recommendation. Similarly, among 
the larceny category, interstate commerce theft has the more severe punishment outcomes 
on the categories of incarceration decision, sentence length, and financial sanction, but is 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Based on this variation in the sample, I repeat the analysis reported in Table 4a and 
Table 4b but remove each specific offense category from the model. The results in Table 
6 indicate that the removal of a specific embezzlement or larceny offense can generate a 
substantial degree of variation across outcomes. For instance, by omitting the offense of 
the bank embezzlement the coefficient for substantial assistance departures increased and 
became statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficient for sentence length gained 
statistical significance and tripled in size from .02 to .07. However, the coefficient for 
incarceration decision decreased and the relationship lost statistical significance, as did the 
relationship for distance from presumptive recommendation. As bank embezzlement 
constitutes 27 percent of all white-collar cases, it is not particularly surprising to see such 
substantial changes in the model based on removal of this offense. Thus, the sensitivity of 
the results demonstrates how findings white-collar crime research may vary dramatically 
based on definitional approach and the inclusion or exclusion or certain types of offenses 
that may alter nature of the sample used in research. 
 While, the results in Table 6 highlight that model is sensitive to changes in types of 
crime included in the analysis, the removal of certain offense categories, such as 
embezzlement of public money has relatively little impact on the results. Yet the removal 
of other types of offenses, such as of bank embezzlement or postal embezzlement, as well 
as a larceny offenses, such as theft of U.S. property could dramatically change the 
outcomes. These patterns are meaningful given that specific types of offenses embedded 
within overarching crime categories such as embezzlement or larceny can have a large 





future research should continue to disaggregate measures of primary crime types to 
understand the influence of specific charges on the underlying distribution.  
 In order to obtain the sample of offenses, this study relies on an offense-based 
definition of white-collar crime used in the Yale Studies on White-Collar Crime and 
subsequently includes all cases defined as either embezzlement or larceny by the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission. Still, the finding that the results are sensitive based on the types 
of offenses included in the analysis and a different set of offenses under the definition used 
may provide different results. This findings, thus, has important implications as the 
definition of white-collar crime is a highly debated topic (Benson & Simpson, 2009). As 
selecting a definition sets the parameters for the inclusion of specific types of offenses, 
researchers should remain conscious of the ways including different types of offenses may 
alter results. Consequently, transparency should remain a central theme in future analysis, 
and researchers should clearly justify the definition used, why certain cases were included 
or omitted, and should conduct further analyses to determine the ways in which results may 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sensitivity Analysis: Fiscal Years 2005-2007 
 
A potential limitation confounding the results of the study is related to the time 
period used for the analysis. In 2008, at the start of series of data used in the current 
analysis, the United States was entering what later became known as the Global Financial 
Crisis. Prior research has offered mixed results as to how widely publicized events related 
to white-collar crime or political scandals, such as Watergate or the collapse of Enron may 
impact sentencing of white-collar offenders (see Hagan & Palloni, 1986; Benson & 
Walker, 1988; Van Slyke & Bales, 2012). As the onset of the Global Financial Crisis is 
often in part attributed to the malfeasant behavior of white-collar employees, such as Wall 
Street bankers and mortgage lenders, the results may be sensitive to the time period selected 
(Barak, 2012). To assess this possibility, I repeat the main analysis in this study using the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission for the three years preceding the Global Financial Crisis, 
from fiscal years 2005-2007.  
 Table 7a and Table 7b show the results for punishment severity for white-collar 
offenders remain relatively stable across outcomes between fiscal years 2005-2007 and 
2008-2010, although small variation does exist (See also Appendix H for descriptive 
statistics). First, the effect of pretrial detainment remains the same, with the results in the 
years prior to the Global Financial Crisis finding that the sample of embezzlement 
offenders are significantly less likely to face pretrial detainment. Next, the results of both 
substantial assistance and downward departures remain substantively similar with both 
models findings a non-significant difference of the likelihood of receiving either type of 
downward departure for white-collar offenders. Similarly, the results across both models 





and find no significant effect for the sentence length for the subsample who received a 
period of incarceration across the two samples.  
 Still, the results do diverge on two outcomes. The model of 2008-2010 finds a 
significant negative effect between the amount of financial sanctions imposed and being 
charged with embezzlement. However, in the model using years 2005-2007, the results of 
the financial sanctions coefficient is no longer significant and the magnitude of the 
coefficient is approaching zero. Further, the main results report that embezzlement 
offenders are significantly more likely to be sentenced above the presumptive guideline 
recommendation. However, the model using years 2005-2007, there is no significant 
difference between the groups of offenders in the difference from the presumptive 
sentence. Thus, these two outcomes suggest that in the years following the Global Financial 
Crisis, embezzlement offenders were punished less severely in terms of financial sanctions, 
but more severely by being sentenced above the presumptive sentence recommendation.  
 Overall, the comparison of results from both before and after the global financial 
crisis show slight variation across outcomes between embezzlement and larceny offenders. 
While most outcomes remained similar across the two models, I find changes in the 
coefficients and significance level for the amount of financial sanctions distance of 
sentence length from the presumptive guideline recommendation between the models using 
fiscal years 2005-2007 and 2008-2010. The current analysis is too limited to draw any 
conclusions as to whether the political climate stemming from the global financial crisis 
directly affected punishment outcomes for embezzlement offenders in federal criminal 
proceedings. I encourage future research to continue to explore this association and gain 





recession brought on by the global financial crisis may impact punishment outcomes of 

















































































































































































































































































































Observations 3,558 2,761 2,761 3,589 
R2/Model Fit .23 .07 .07 .48 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District 















































































































































    































































































Observations 2,863 1,608 3,589 
R2/Model Fit .55 .72 .26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District 












Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion  
 
Scholars interested in disparities in punishment continue to study ways in which 
status characteristics of individuals and groups of offenders may influence punishment 
outcomes. However, sentencing research remains limited as the majority of empirical 
scholarship focuses on disparities across the generic group all criminal offenders or instead 
concentrates specifically on violent, drug, or property offenders. Receiving significantly 
less attention from researchers of criminal punishment are white-collar offenders. The lack 
of research on punishment of white-collar offenders represents a particularly substantial 
limitation, as the appropriate levels of punishment for white-collar offenses remains an 
issue generating a large degree of focus among criminal justice practitioners and 
policymakers (see Bibas, 2005; Richman, 2013; Dervan, 2014; Tucker, 2014) 
This research specifically sought to address this gap in the literature and assess 
whether punishment outcomes among a sample of criminal offenders in federal district 
courts differed among those convicted of the white-collar charge of embezzlement or the 
street crime offense of larceny. The rationale to compare these two groups of offenders was 
rooted in a series of policy changes explicitly aimed at linking the punishment outcomes 
of certain white-collar crimes, including embezzlement with non-violent property offenses, 
such as larceny at the federal level, as well as shifts in public opinion expressing a desire 
for more severe punishment toward white-collar offenders. To expand upon prior research 
in this area, this study added a series of punishment processes and outcomes not previously 
used in sentencing research on white-collar crime, as well as explored the variability within 
the all-encompassing categories of embezzlement and larceny by investigating differences 





 The results of the study illustrate that the answer to the question of whether white-
collar offenders are treated leniently, severely, or about the same in comparison to larceny 
offenders in federal district courts varies based on the outcomes of interest and the specific 
type of offense included in the analysis. The main results report that in some regards, the 
sample of larceny offenders are treated more severely. The findings illustrate that larceny 
offenders are significantly more likely to receive pretrial detention, as well as significantly 
higher financial sanctions at sentencing. However, across other outcomes, embezzlement 
offenders are found to experience harsher punishment, with embezzlers being more likely 
to be sentenced to a period of incarceration and also receiving sentences higher than the 
presumptive recommendation in comparison to larceny offenders.  Still, across measures 
of downward departures and sentence length, this study finds no significant difference 
across the sample of embezzlement and larceny offenders.  
Ultimately, the results suggests that although policies focusing on sentence length 
between these white-collar and non-violent property offenders may have in part succeeded 
in reducing differences in sentence length, there remain several other types of outcomes 
that must be considered when seeking to understand differences in punishment outcomes. 
Research only looking to the actual sentence length provided to the offender only uncovers 
a small piece of the puzzle. Future researchers should consider these findings and look 
across several outcomes to gage punishment severity. Moreover, the findings have 
implications for the debate around the appropriate definition of white-collar crime, as the 
analysis reveals that the results remain sensitive when specific types of embezzlement or 
larceny offenses included or excluded from the analysis. This is an important implication, 





focusing on either the offense or the offender commonly employed in academic research 
(Benson & Simpson, 2009). As, the selection of one definition instead another can alter the 
sample and subsequently the results of the analysis, future research should be cognizant of 
this issue and provide thoughtful consideration when defining white-collar crime. 
The findings also present an interesting result regarding downward departures. 
Specifically, there is a positive but non-significant effect indicating that embezzlement 
offenders may be more likely to receive downward departures than larceny offenders. This 
is a particularly important finding as policy changes enacted since the implementation of 
the sentencing guidelines have often increased severity levels for white-collar offenses, 
such as embezzlement, while decreasing the severity levels for comparable non-violent 
property offenses (see Bibas, 2005). An implication of this findings may be that judges are 
seeking to alter a pattern of white-collar sentencing levels that have become increasingly 
severe since the 1980s (Podgor, 2007; Richman, 2013). For instance, a Congressional 
report on sentencing disparities following U.S. v. Booker, found evidence for an increasing 
frequency of downward departures in the favor of fraud offenders (Richman, 2013). 
Regarding these findings, a major factor driving these results appeared to be concern from 
judges that fraud guidelines were inappropriate to the crime committed often providing 
punishment recommendations that were viewed as too severe.34 It appears then that in light 
                                                            
34 For instance, on this matter, Preet Bharara the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York stated 
“There is concern, based on the experience of some Districts, that more and more, particularly in the context 
of high-loss, large-scale fraud cases, there are not consistently tough and fair outcomes. We have observed—
and the Commission’s data have confirmed—that district courts are relying less and less on the sentencing 
guidelines, which are now advisory. Some are voicing concern that the fraud guidelines counsel sentences 
that are inappropriate to the crime committed . . . Others have expressed frustration that the guidelines provide 
inadequate assistance in developing intelligent and consistent sentencing decisions in certain white collar 






of increasingly severe punishment for this class of offenders, judges may become more 
likely to depart downward from guideline recommendations.  
 Although this study provides insight into differences in punishment outcomes 
across offenders convicted of embezzlement and larceny in federal criminal proceedings, 
there are several important limitations of the current analysis. First, the findings are strictly 
limited to those offenders charged with either embezzlement or larceny in federal criminal 
courts. This is an important limitation for research on white-collar crime as the particular 
analysis deals with a very unique portion of all white-collar offenders. Specifically, those 
white-collar offenders included in this study most likely represent “run of the mill” white-
collar crimes (Wheeler et al., 1982). Largely omitted from this sample are large-scale 
white-collar offenders and those offenses appearing in civil or regulatory proceedings 
instead of criminal court. As criminal punishment constitutes only one option in pursuit of 
justice against white-collar offenders, future research should expand upon this analysis and 
consider sentencing outcomes for white-collar offenders charged with civil or regulatory 
proceedings.  
 Additionally, the current analysis only includes two types of crime: embezzlement 
and larceny. Although these two types of crime are selected because their comparability 
for the purpose of the study, they are certainty not representative of all white-collar and 
non-violent property offenses tried in federal court. As such, any findings of this study are 
limited to this specific group of embezzlement and larceny offenders in this sample. There 
remain many other types of white-collar crime prosecuted in criminal courts and 
researchers in this area should continue explore punishment outcomes for different types 





 Third, the current analysis is limited in the model specification. While U.S. 
Sentencing Commission data allows for a robust analysis of the sentencing decision, a 
number of important variables are not available, which may limit the current analysis. For 
instance, the USSC data lack information on plea-bargaining or specific variables 
indicating case complexity, which may be an important moderating factors to consider in 
sentencing outcomes of white-collar cases (see Albonetti 1997, 1998). Moreover, the data 
do not have information on income or the type of counsel used, which could be key factors 
in explaining differences in punishment between white-collar and street offenders. 
Researchers should continue to explore this issue and seek additional case information and 
data on prosecution of white-collar crime in order more fully tests hypotheses and better 
understand the progression of white-collar offenders through the criminal justice system.  
Additionally, aside from potential issues arising from omitted variables, another 
limitation stems from the fact that the current model omits prosecutorial decision making 
in charging decisions and how this process may affect outcomes of white-collar offenders. 
For instance, looking at federal prosecutorial charging decisions in federal criminal 
proceedings, Shermer & Johnson (2010) find that extralegal characteristics are related the 
likelihood of receiving charges reductions. Moreover, the findings suggest that disparities 
may operate in offense-specific ways, with certain extralegal characteristics interacting the 
offense-specific charges to alter the likelihood of receiving a charge reduction (see also 
Albonetti, 2003). If certain groups of white-collar offenders receive differential treatment 
in prosecutorial charging decisions, then selection bias will affect the cases that are in the 
judicial pipeline and typescripts theory would suggest that the analysis in this thesis will 





operating.35 Future research should explore prosecutorial decision making among white-
collar offenders and how that process may affect final sentencing outcomes.  
Finally, there are methodological limitations of the current analysis. The main 
methodological constraint is that sentencing in the current sample is highly censored at a 
value of zero. In other words, for the subset of offenders who are convicted but not sent to 
prison, all that is observed on the outcomes is that the sentence severity falls below the 
threshold of interest (i.e. imprisonment), and thus, sentence severity for these censored 
individuals are not observed on the sentence length outcome. 
This censoring at zero-months incarceration creates methodological issues as under 
such conditions ordinary least squares regression only on those offenders above the 
censoring threshold may produces invalid inferences (see Maddala, 1983; Greene, 1997; 
Smith & Brame, 2003). As an alternative approach sentencing scholars have often turned 
to Tobit estimation, which allows censored cases to remain in the statistical model by 
censoring cases falling below the threshold of zero-months of incarceration (Albonneti, 
1997; Bushway & Phiel, 2001; Kurlycheck & Johnson, 2004).36 However, Smith & Brame 
(2003), demonstrate the Tobit method is heavily constrained by a proportionality 
assumption and conclude that “when the Tobit proportionality assumption is violated, the 
Tobit estimator can be highly misleading” (p. 379). Given the high amount of censoring in 
                                                            
35 For instance, Albonetti, (1998: p. 374) notes “the increased uncertainty of successfully obtaining a trial 
conviction in these complex white-collar crimes increases the value to the prosecuting attorney of obtaining 
a guilty plea. As such, I suggest that defendants charged with a complex white-collar crime are in an 
advantageous position to negotiate and to receive a shorter length of imprisonment.” 
36 It is well known that ordinary least squares will produce inconsistent estimates of the regression parameters 
if the dependent variable is censored…Tobit and other limited dependent variable models is being employed 
with increasing frequency to avoid this inconsistency. But the assumptions required of these models are quite 
strong and any violation, such as heteroscedasticity or nonnormality, may result in an asymptotic bias as 





the current sample, it is possible the Tobit model (as well as OLS) are prone to producing 
invalid inferences on the highly censored outcome of sentence length, and thus results 
should be interrupted with an understanding of this potential limitation.37 However, this 
study has attempted the use of number of diagnostic techniques and alternative methods, 
and due limitations based on the nature of the data and alternative approaches available, I 
consider the approach used in the analysis to be appropriate. Additionally, aside from 
sentence length, I include a number of other outcomes not effected the methodological 
issues related to high degrees of censoring. Nevertheless, future research should continue 
to clarify the questions addressed in this analysis using different data and research 
techniques.          
 In conclusion, this study moved beyond a simple comparison of differences in 
incarceration and sentence length between a sample of white-collar and street offenders 
(see Wheeler et al., 1982; Maddan et al., 2013). In light of shifts in public opinion toward 
white-collar crime and multiple policy implementations to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
focusing on punishment of white-collar offenders over the past 30 years, this study sought 
to deeper understanding of differences in punishment across offenses traditionally viewed 
as white-collar and street crimes. By drawing on several punishment outcomes not 
previously addressed in white-collar sentencing research, I find a substantial degree of 
variation in punishment severity between the sample of embezzlement and larceny 
offenders. These findings highlight the importance of including multiple outcomes of 
interest, as well as carefully considering the definition of white-collar crime and the ways 
in which different definitions may alter the scope of the sample and subsequent findings. 
                                                            
37 Under the tobit proportionality assumption “processes generating the censoring even and the conditional 





Thus, while the current analysis constitutes progress in understanding punishment for 
white-collar criminals, scholars of white-collar crime and criminal punishment should 
continue work in this area to more fully develop a theoretical framework and understanding 
criminal justice decision making in regards to the white-collar criminal.  
As the concept of “equality before the law” serves as a cornerstone of the American 
criminal justice system and remains a primary indicator of which types of behaviors are 
not tolerated, this study argues there is vital need to focus greater attention on punishment 
of white-collar crimes. In light of the limited knowledge in this area and recent changes to 
laws regulating judicial discretion and corporate activity, coupled with a series of major 
incidents of white-collar and corporate crime, it is necessary to expand scholarship 
regarding criminal justice decision-making and punishment for white-collar offenders. As 
recognized over three decades ago, “the examination of the prosecution and sentencing of 
white-collar crime can tell us much about how the social organization of a particular type 
of crime can influence the way it is controlled. In turn, this type of understanding may do 
much to enlighten a long tradition of research on status characteristics and sentencing 
(Hagan et al., 1980: 817).” Thus, this research begins to fills an important gap in the 






















Maine 24 12 12 
Massachusetts 35 18 17 
New Hampshire 4 3 1 
Rhode Island 8 5 3 
Puerto Rico 19 15 4 
Connecticut 22 15 7 
New York North 12 8 4 
New York East 35 19 16 
New York South 104 84 20 
New York West 46 36 10 
Vermont 16 10 6 
Delaware 2 0 2 
New Jersey 71 41 30 
Penn. East 35 25 10 
Penn. Mid 45 32 13 
Penn. West 30 21 9 
Maryland 45 36 9 
N Carolina East 44 38 6 
N Carolina Mid 28 17 11 
N Carolina West 31 17 14 
South Carolina 137 113 24 
Virginia East 98 75 23 
Virginia West 27 17 10 
W Virginia North 17 9 8 
W Virginia South 24 10 14 
Alabama North 84 57 27 
Alabama Mid 79 62 17 
Alabama South 48 36 12 
Florida North 45 26 19 
Florida Mid 133 114 19 
Florida South 88 72 16 
Georgia North 35 23 12 
Georgia Mid 40 29 11 
Georgia South 25 15 10 
Louisiana East 74 60 14 
Louisiana West 48 26 22 
Miss. North 8 1 7 
Miss. South 110 92 18 





Texas East 49 36 13 
Texas South 63 27 36 
Texas West 78 43 35 
Kentucky East 51 27 24 
Kentucky West 27 10 17 
Michigan East 51 29 22 
Michigan West 29 3 26 
Ohio North 126 79 47 
Ohio South 46 26 20 
Tennessee East 34 16 18 
Tennessee Mid 23 12 11 
Tennessee West 41 25 16 
Illinois North 102 60 42 
Illinois Cent. 23 8 15 
Illinois South 21 9 12 
Indiana North 37 25 12 
Indiana South 39 16 23 
Wisconsin East 29 16 13 
Wisconsin West 16 5 11 
Arkansas East 26 15 11 
Arkansas West 15 11 4 
Iowa North 9 7 2 
Iowa South 33 17 16 
Minnesota 28 10 18 
Missouri East 48 26 22 
Missouri West 48 31 17 
Nebraska 20 10 10 
South Dakota 68 44 24 
Arizona 168 140 28 
California North 38 29 9 
California East 68 57 11 
California Cent. 158 137 21 
California South 33 24 9 
Hawaii 15 12 3 
Idaho 18 9 9 
Montana 55 27 28 
Nevada 44 33 11 
Oregon 46 31 15 
Washington East 14 7 7 
Washington West 39 16 23 
Colorado 59 32 27 
Kansas 31 15 16 
New Mexico 40 29 11 
Oklahoma North 44 25 19 
Oklahoma East 26 7 19 





Utah 41 31 10 
Wyoming 9 3 6 
Dist. Of Columbia 49 30 19 
Virgin Islands 2 1 1 
Guam 19 17 2 
N Mariana Island 6 2 4 
Alaska 18 7 11 
Louisiana Middle 16 13 3 
























Appendix B: Tobit Analysis, FY 2008-2010 
 Ln Financial  
Sanction 
Ln Sentence  
Length  































































































Appendix B: Continued 
 Ln Financial  
Sanction 













































Observations 4,210 4,210 
R2/Model Fit .18 .33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District        




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix F: Pretrial Detainment Categories  
 
Full Sample 
(n = 4,210) 
Embezzlement 
(n = 1,408) 
Larceny 
(n = 2,802) 
Variable   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
In custody .26 .44 0.15* 0.36 0.32* 0.47 
Released on bail/bond .50 .22 0.57* .50 0.47* 0.49 
Released on own recognizance .21 .43 0.25* 0.43 0.19* 0.39 
Released – other .01 .49 0.02* 0.17 0.01* 0.14 
Pretrial detainment info missing 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.1 
      * Indicates difference is statistically significant at the p < .05 level 



























Appendix G: Summary of Disaggregated Offense Types  
FY 2005-2007 
Offense Type Obs. Percentage 
Embezzlement Offenses (White-Collar)   
     Bank Embezzlement 478 36.43 
     Postal Embezzlement 340 25.91 
     Embezzles of Public Money and Properties  57 4.34 
     Embezzlement – Lending, Credit, Insurance 56 4.27 
     Embezzlement – Veterans Relief  9 .69 
     Embezzle- Government Officer or Employee 11 .84 
     Embezzlement – Other 361 27.52 
    Total Embezzlement  1,312  
Larceny Offenses (Street)    
    Larceny & theft – Bank 171 7.51 
    Larceny & theft – Postal 697 30.61 
    Larceny & theft – Interstate Commerce 90 3.95 
    Theft of U.S. Property 1,231 54.06 
    Theft of Maritime Property 75 3.29 
    Larceny & theft – Other Felony 13 .57 

















  Appendix H: Descriptive Statistics FY, 2005-2007 
 
Full Sample 
(n = 3,589) 
Embezzlement 
(n = 1,312) 
Larceny 
(n = 2,277) 
Variable   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Pretrial Detainment  
(N = 3,558) 
.27 .45 .13* .34 .36* .48 
Substantial assistance departure 
(N = 2,761) 
.05 .22 .05 .21 .05 .22 
Downward departure 
(N = 2,761) 
.15 .36 .20* .40 .13* .34 
Incarceration 
(N = 3,589) 
.45 .50 .47* .50 .44* .49 
Ln financial sanction 
(N = 2,863) 
1.08 1.156 1.55* 1.36 1.10* .98 
Ln sentence length 
(N = 1,608) 
1.48 1.45 2.63* .91 2.63* .81 
Distance from Presumptive  
(N = 3,589)  
-2.16 10.50 -3.24* 7.02 -1.48* 12.23 
Control Variables       
Presumptive sentence  
10.40   15.27   12.30*   16.02   9.64*   15.33  
Ln presumptive sentence  1.71   1.30   1.86*   1.34   1.65*   1.27  
Criminal history   1.81   1.46   1.14*   .51   2.12*   1.64  
Pretrial detainment  .28   .45   .13*   .34   .36*   .48  
Pretrial detainment info missing  .02   .13   .01   .11   .01   .08  
Guilty plea  .97   .17   .95*   .21   .98*   .15  
Counts of conviction  .18   .38   .17*   .37   .19*   .39  
Ln financial sanction  .98   1.14   1.30*   1.37   .85*   .97  
No departure  .74   .44   .71*   .46   .76*   .43  
Upward departure  .02   .13   .01*   .08   .02*   .15  
Substantial assistance departure  .04   .20   .04*   .21   .04*  .20  
Downward departure  .14   .35   .18*   .39   .12*   .33  
Departure information missing  .06   .27   .06   .27  .06    .27 
White  .54   .50  .63* .48  .50*   .50  
Black  .28   .45  .21* .41  .33*   .47  
Hispanic   .09   .29  .06* .24  .10*   .30  
Other Race  .07   .26  .08* .28  .06*   .24  
Race Missing/Unknown .02 .13 .01 .12 .01 .12 
Male  .55   .50   .48*   .50   .58*   .49  
Age 40.01 12.19  41.70*   11.12   39.26*   12.62  
U.S. Citizen  .95   .21   .98*   .13   .94*   .24  
U.S. Citizen info Missing  .01   .11   .00   .06   .01   .08  






Appendix H: Continued 
 
Full Sample 
(n = 3,589) 
Embezzlement 
(n = 1,312) 
Larceny 
(n = 2,277) 
Variable   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
HS Graduate  .28   .45   .33*   .47   .25*   0.44  
Some College Education  .29   .45   .38*   .49   .25*   0.43  
College Graduate  .10   .30   .17*   .38   .07*   0.25  
Education information missing   .02   .14   .01*   .07   .02*   0.12  
Dependents  .60   .49   .66*   .47  .58* 0.49 
Year dummies - - - - - - 
* Indicates difference between embezzlement and larceny categories is statistically 






















Appendix I: Tobit Analysis, FY 2005-2007 
 Ln Financial  
Sanction 
Ln Sentence  
Length  































































































Appendix I: Continued 
 Ln Financial  
Sanction 













































Observations 3,589 3,589 
R2/Model Fit .15 .33 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on District        
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